vyAvASTHA'-DARPANA. 447 able property for her life, of her entitled to one third ofಟಿe estate, real and personal, according to the rules of the Hindu lavo" S. C. Cons. H. L. pp. 69–72. - In the case of Kashi Náth k and Ramia Náth Basa k versus Hara sundari Dási, and in that of Guru Prasād Bose versus Shib Chandra Bose and others, the (Supreme) Court was called upon to consider, whether or not, the widow and the mother had a right to an absolute estate in the movable property. In each case, the decree by which such a right had been declared, was amended, and the declaration was expunged. ' The opinions delivered by the J ുടേ were unequivocal, and it was well understood by the profession, that no more than an estate for life in movable property could be taken by a widow in right of her husband, or by a mother upon partition made among her sons.f Cons. H. L. pp. 44, 45. THE PATERNAL GRAND MOTHER TAŘEs A SHARE. 141 when the paternal grandfather's estate is divided by grandsons, the grand mother takes a share equal to that of a grandson. Bven childless wives of the father are pronounced equal sharers; so are all the grandmothers: they are declared equal to mothers Vyasa. By the exqression ‘equal to mothers' it is shown that as the mother is entitled to an equal share in the partition of her husband’s property made by her own sons, so in the partition of the grandfather's property made by the grand sons, the grand mother has an equal share with them.f
- Upon this occasion the Court pandits were consulted, and they expressly declared that the mother
who took upon partition, and the widow who succeeded to the husband's property, stood upon the same footing with regard to their interests in the estatess There is not in fact any distinction as far as the right extends, nor do I believe that any ground of នៃtiញុំ can be fonthd in the Hindu Law. The Supreme Court has always considered the mother who takes upon partition, and the widow who succeeds to the estate of her husband, as possessed of equal interests. And it is to be lamented, when two opportunities occurred, that the Court did not insert,in its decrees, the decided opinion which it eutertained upon the subject; that it did not declare the widow and the mother entitled to an estate for life only, whi:ther the property of which they came into possession was movable or immovable. That the Court thought the decrees, which declared such parties entitled to an absolute. estate in movable property, ought to be altered, is certain. The opinions of the judges were known and even declared; and as we have not any authority in the books of Hindu law, by which a distinction between movable and immovable property in the possession of a mother or a widow can be justified, it will, I trust. i.e. thought proper to abide by the rule which may be said to have been laid down, and to *old in future that neither widow succeeding to her husband, nor mothor sharing upon partition, shall be entitled to incre than a life interest in movable property. The power"of expenditure may be especially given in particular cases.—Sir Francis Maenaghten's Considerations on the Hindu Law. pp. 78, 74. - 穆 t_Such is also the case with immovable property—the Hindu law making no distinction between the movable and immovable parts of an estate inherited by a woman or received by her on partition. See ante, p. 101. - 桦 Í have been unable to discover the authority, (and I believe there is not any) upon which a distinction between movable and immovable property coming to a widow by the death of her husband, or to a woman by partition made among her descendants, can possibly be supported;—nor do I believe there is any autho rity for saying that a female who so takes, shall have more than a life interest in either. Sir Francis Macmaghten's Considerations on the Hindu Law. p. 82. - t W. Da.. Kra, Sang. p. 108.–See coleb. Da, bha. p. 64. Coleb. Dig, vol. III. p. 27. Cwts.: , l.caring on the Vyavastha.” No. 1 +0. Vyavastis:u Authority
