বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্র (তৃতীয় খণ্ড)/১৫
| শিরোনাম | সূত্র | তারিখ |
|---|---|---|
| বাংলাদেশের আর্থ-সামাজিক অবস্থার উপর বাংলাদেশ সরকারের অর্থনৈতিক উপদেষ্টার একটি প্রতিবেদন | বাংলাদেশ সরকার | ১০ মে, ১৯৭১ |
BANGLADESH:
SITUATION AND OPTIONS
BY
REHMAN SOBHAN
Economics Advisor to the Government of Bangladesh.
May 10, 1971.
In the light of the facts as available, the silence and inertia of the major powers and international bodies is difficult to understand. Whilst it is regarded as idealistic to appeal to the conscience of the world on the planned genocide of at least 200,000 Bengali’s to date, it is sad that their political judgment should be so distorted as to inhibit response.
Today we are witnessing an attempt by a military junta, whose own position is somewhat tenuous, to crush a popularly elected party and the political forces which sustained it. Whilst the representative status of most leaders of insurrections has been ambiguous there can be no doubt that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the Awami League speak for Bangladesh. An electoral mandate which gave them 167 out of 169 seats and 80% of the popular vote puts their credentials beyond question. They represent 75 million people or 55% of what once constituted Pakistan. To confer legitimacy on Yahya and his Junta by accepting his right to talk for Bangladesh effectively writes off 75 million Bengalis who constitute the eighth largest conglomeration of people in the world. This not only makes a mockery of any commitment to democratic principle but is without political sense.
Today the Pakistan government is trying desperately to convince the world that it is in effective control of Bangladesh. They point to the fact that they are in possession of the major towns and that effective resistance has ceased. They draw witness to the fact that administrators are to be found in their offices in the Dacca Secretariat.
What they do not say is that even today the secretariat is not functioning because most of the subordinate staff are still away from Dacca for fear of random killing by the army. That only about 50% of those shops not burnt by the army are open and these function with some trepidation for fear of looting by the army. That even up to the end of April curfew was in force at night in Dacca and those streets after dusk arc largely deserted. That a week ago the army had to mortar villages on the outskirts of Dacca to dislodge “miscreants”. That the army has had to issue martial law order 148 on April 27, which imposes the death penalty on all acts of sabotage on government installations and which states:
“Inhabitants of the surrounding area of all or any such affected place or places will render themselves liable to punitive action collectively.”
This merely gives documentary evidence of resistance and the army response which would be known to anyone who has managed to step out of Dacca.
Here they would find that in the Sylhet where the forests in the Tea Garden areas provide natural cover is still unspecified and under control of the Bengal regiment. That a force is still holding out in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. That all over Bangladesh armed Bengali's have withdrawn into the rural areas and are harassing army units through guerilla action. This may be expected to increase in frequency and intensity as the resistance acquires more skill at this type of warfare, gets additional supplies and weaponry, of which sizeable quantities have already been captured from the Pak Army and when the monsoons make the logistical problems of the army more insecure. The capability for waging prolonged war is there because the political motivation of the people has been guaranteed by the indiscriminate character of the War waged by the army. By destroying villages within the range of their artillery and declaring these areas as “free fire zones” they have made the Pakistan army an object of hatred and a direct threat to the security of 75 million Bengalis who will be willing to resist or aid any resistance to this alien force.
Massive terror has however still secured scant gains for the Pakistan government. Whilst they command major towns these are ghost cities, depopulated, without any economic activity and without any administrative structure. Barely 10% of the population of these towns has stayed behind, if that, whilst the administration, which actually worked with the resistance during the phase when these towns were liberated, is not taking any chances by staying behind. This means that whilst the territorial orbit of army control may cover the province, in effect not more than a million out of 75 million Bengalis are within their administrative control. The army holds key junctions and operates along the grids set by the road network which permits it to move in heavily armed motorized convoys from one town to another.
As a consequence of this tenuous hold over the region, economic life is at a standstill. Even in the industrial areas of Dacca, Chittagong and Khulna, those industries which have not deliberately been destroyed, are barely operative because most of the labor force is still in the villages, fearing reprisal by the army. Exports are at a standstill because of the breakdown of communications and the disruption of the marketing framework. Many key personnel in the marketing of jute and other commodities, as well as imports, were either West Pakistani's or Hindus. These have fled or been killed so that very little can be expected to move in or out of Bangladesh in the near future. Congestion at Chittagong port due to continued absenteeism by port workers has further aggravated the problem.
Economic breakdown in Bangladesh is in itself of only marginal interest to the Yahya Government. Scorched earth policies which have, through the use of U.S. financed Saborjets and Chinese Migs, destroyed grain stores, tea gardens, factories, and.... Storage installations (at Brahmanbaria) point to starvation and economic dislocation as a weapon of intimidation in the hands of the Army.
The attendant loss of 50% of the country's foreign exchange earnings which came from Bangladesh through its export of jute products is of more immediate concern. 80% of the free foreign exchange from Bangladesh exports was used in West Pakistan. This cannot immediately be replaced by increased exports from the West were industry is already down 40% capacity operations due to shortage of foreign exchange.
To this end the Pakistan government is pressing for a rescheduling of its debt service liabilities which requires payment about £100 mil 10 sundry creditors by the end of June. Over and above this, Pakistan needs fresh aid commitments mainly for commodity imports to stimulate her ailing industry but also to maintain the momentum of development. Whilst her own exchange earnings have fallen drastically because of the cessation of Bangladesh export her own exchange needs remain high. In normal times West Pakistan Imports were double its exports but today the need to purchase arms and ammunitions to replenish and augment stores to sustain its war on Bangladesh have further increased. French arms suppliers have been approached for a moratorium on debt repayment and for better terms for, interalia, 30 Mirage fighters, currently on order. Actual or contemplated freezing of U.S. military supplies will require more cash foreign exchange to compensate this loss by turning to the open market for arms.
The visit of Mr. M.M. Ahmed is therefore of considerable importance, because Pakistan now expects the World Bank, the U.S. and other aid donors to bail it out of its current economic crisis and in effect underwrite its military operations in Bangladesh. Any suggestion that aid will be used for alleviating famine in Bangladesh and reconstructing the war damage is deliberately misleading. The government's writ does not extend beyond the range of its guns and it lacks the administrative control or machinery to implement any aid programmed. It would likely divert any aid for East Pakistan to the West and use food grains to feed its occupation army or as an instrument of political coercion and patronage.
In this context there is therefore no question of any aid donor playing a neutral role. By responding to the needs of the Pakistan administration they will in fact not be performing any humanitarian service but will be underwriting the military action. By refusing to reschedule debt service liabilities as demanded by Pakistan and withholding further commitments of aid, including what is a already in the pipeline, the full cost of this military adventure can be brought home to the regime.
The world must realize that aid giving can never return to a “business as usual” posture as it did following the India-Pakistan war in 1965 and the downfall of the Ayub regime in 1968. Thus the aid givers should also guard against any subterfuge vis-a-vis the debt or in any form-which is intended to convey the impression that Pakistan is acting in good faith. Murderers of 200,000 unarmed civilians do not know the meaning of acting in good faith.
The economic dislocation in Bangladesh has already cost West Pakistan its captive market. There are no customers, income or marketing framework to accommodate West Pakistan's exports to Bangladesh which account for 40 % of their total exports. Industries which used to selling their wares at up to 100 % above world prices face ruin and a major economic recession threatens West Pakistan's business world. A 50 % price inflation is also anticipated within the next three months due to a fall in industrial output and imports. The foreign- exchange crunch has led to the abolition of the free list for imports; the complete ban on 47 items for import and the placement of licensed imports on cash- cum-bonus. In effect all imports are on bonus and a partial devaluation has already been carried through. The economic position of the country therefore makes the government highly vulnerable to economic pressures exercised by aid donors.
But to what end can pressures be used? The objective clearly lies in an end to military action as substitute for political discussion. Here negotiations can only take place with the leader and elected representatives of the people of Bangladesh. Attempts to resurrect discarded political hacks from the political grave dug for them at the recent polls not only makes the government an object of derision but clearly cannot deliver any sort of secure settlement.
Today the political leadership is still in the hands of the victors at the polls-the Awami League. Their leadership structure is intact and except for Mujib, physically present to conduct the government of Bangladesh. The Cabinet which presented itself to the world on April 17, 1971, consists of the entire party hierarchy. In collaboration with the civil administration who have withdrawn beyond the range of the Army guns. and sustained by the military strength of the Bangladesh liberation army, the government is attempting to establish a formal administrative structure and line of command in the rural areas of Bangladesh. The task is rendered difficult because of the novelty of the situation and formidable logistical problems but over a period this will provide the political and administrative infrastructure for the guerilla war which is being waged against the army and which can be sustained indefinitely.
This should not delude the world into believing that they can sit back and reserve their options. The longer the war goes on the more the present leadership and control structure is jeopardized. Today leadership is still in the hands of moderates who are sufficiently concerned about destroying the existing social and economic format of Bangladesh to opposc cven the blowing up of key bridges and vital economic installations as part of the tactics of resistance. Army terror, prolonged an pervastive. will compel extreme responses which will be less inhibited about destroying the existing social organisms as parts of the technique of waging total war against an occupation army. Ilistory provides too many lessons about the social consequences of prolonged war for this point to be reemphasized.
Yet another cost of inaction is likely to be the price in human life. The West Pakistan army is itself likely to raise its toll of Bengali life to the million mark. In the event of a military conclusion to the war the possibility of communal carnage through reprisals on Bengalis in the West wing and non-Bengalis in the East may add another million to the death toll, thus raising it to above two million. If we add the potential death toll from famine this could become one of history's major human tragedies, Nor can one expect the region to remain insulated from the rival concerns of big power conflicts. Both India and China surround or are close to Bangladesh and cannot expect to remain bystanders as the fires of civil war wage within sight of their borders. With the Victnam war in its closing stages it is hardly in the interests of the big powers to remain witness to another conflagration in the area which promises to exceed in dimension anything witnessed thus far.
There is a chance to contain an international crisis whilst it is, still in its infancy. There is still a leadership structure in Bangladesh which can be available to negotiate a political settlement. This settlement must aim for a peaceful parting of the ways. Yahya's genocidal war clearly indicates that, he is convinced that Pakistan is dead and that not even a shared humanity binds its two peoples. In Bangladesh the totality of the revulsion engendered by this war makes any attempt to bind up the wounds unthinkable. The task for the future remains to come to terms with the reality of Bangladesh so that a sustained programme of massive economic reconstruction can attempt to rebuild this shattered nation and lift its people from the depths of poverty, starvation and disease to which they have been reduced. Such a programme must inspire the conscience of the world already aroused by the horrors of the cyclone and now this war. With international assistance on a sufficient scale Bangladesh can yet be saved from disaster and can build for the future within the framework of democracy and social justice.