বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্র (ত্রয়োদশ খণ্ড)/৬৪
| শিরোনাম | সূত্র | তারিখ |
| পররাষ্ট্র দপ্তর কর্মকর্তা কর্তৃক সিনেটর বার্চ বে’র পত্রের জবাব | সিনেটের কার্যবিবরণী | ২৭ অক্টোবর, ১৯৭১ |
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C., August 26, 1971.
Hon. Birch Bayh,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
Dear Senator Bayh: The Secretary has asked me to reply to your letter of August 12 concerning United States policy in the current crisis in East Pakistan.
Your letter touches on numerous aspects of the crisis. The questions you raise are difficult ones reflecting the exceedingly complex and serious policy issues that are involved. I think you will agree that the answers are also difficult, for all of us, as this Government seeks to pursue policies that will preserve both our own interests and help make a contribution toward relieving the great humanitarian aspects of the crisis.
Our approach to this difficult situation from the outset has been essentially threefold. First, to alleviate the suffering of the millions of people caught up in this great human tragedy, we have been in the forefront of humanitarian relief efforts, on both sides of the border. We intend to continue that role. Secondly, because of the obvious dangers of conflict between India and Pakistan which would so drastically worsen this crisis, we have counseled restraint with both countries. We are continuing to do so. Thirdly, recognizing the essential need to focus on the root cause of the problem, we have urged the Government of Pakistan to move as quickly as it can with steps that will begin the urgent talk of a peaceful political accommodation. To the extent we can meaningfully contribute to this process, we will continue this effort.
We believe that this policy is the right one under the circumstances. We intend to persevere in the various efforts that make up this policy, conscious in doing so of both the limitations on what any outside power can do to influence the actions of sovereign powers in such a crisis and of the compulsions that rest on the entire world community to be responsive in a tragedy of such proportions and potential.
Let me now respond to your questions about the various elements that go into our policy.
There has been a widespread and erroneous belief that the United States has been a major supplier of arms to Pakistan since the critical days of March 1971. In fact, we have provided no lethal end-items of military equipment since our grant military program in Pakistan was suspended (later terminated) in September 1965. Since that time Pakistan has obtained equipment from several suppliers, including China, the USSR, and France. We must assume that some of this equipment has been used in East Pakistan, as well as equipment that we previously supplied, but we have no way of knowing the proportions of use in the present crisis. We regret that U.S. equipment has been so used and have so advised the Government of Pakistan, which however sees itself as within its sovereign right in using its military forces to preserve its internal Security as it sees best.
What we have sold to Pakistan since 1965 has been limited to a very large degree to such end items as transport and communications equipment and spare parts for previously supplied U.S. equipment. Some ammunition was also sold. After Fighting broke out in East Pakistan in late March of this year, we took action to suspend all further sale-except for those items in the pipeline where valid licenses were outstanding. What has gone to Pakistan since that time, under those valid licenses, has been almost entirely spare parts and, because many of the licenses either expired or were not utilized, has totaled no more than $3 to $4 million. No military ammunition has been involved. As of the present time what remains of the pipeline represents a Figure considerably less than $4 million, and this figure will continue to decline as the few remaining licenses are utilized or expire.
Thus what we are talking about is not only a small figure but one with little real military consequence in East Pakistan. We have not felt we should apply a full embargo on these remaining shipments because of our wish to avoid arbitrary actions with the Government of Pakistan that could limit the role we may be able to play in helping to restore peaceful conditions,
We have been similarly guided in our approach to economic aid. We have not provided any new bilateral economic aid (except for humanitarian assistance) since the fighting began, but we have felt that formally to terminate existing projects would not only be counterproductive for the flexibility we seek to retain in our overall relationship with Pakistan but would in the final analysis be detrimental to the people of Pakistan. This is the position of most, if not all, other aid donors to Pakistan As for the future we have said that we look forward to resuming our support for what was a promising development effort prior to the events in March, but that we could do so only in the context of a revised national development plan encompassing both wings. Any such revision by the Pakistan must obviously take full account of the current political situation. We do not believe this position differs materially from that of most other donors.
You refer to our role in humanitarian relief. There our purpose is clear and, we hope, unquestioned-to support as effectively and strongly as we can the efforts of the international community led by the United Nations to relieve human suffering and to prevent future famine. Both the President and the Secretary of State have made clear our determination to provide all-out support for this effort. In doing so it would be difficult to guarantee particularly under present conditions in East Pakistan, that our relief contributions will in every case be fully and effectively utilized, but we are reasonably confident that our contributions and those of others are in fact reaching the people concerned. That confidence will be strengthened as the United Nations establishes itself on the ground in East Pakistan an operation to which we are giving full and material support. It is our strong hope and belief that as this U.N. led effort of relief and rehabilitation gets underway in East Pakistan it will help restore confidence among the people of East Pakistan, which in turn should contribute to conditions that will encourage a return flow of those refugees now in India. We are under no illusions on this score, however, since we recognize full well that there can be no significant return of the millions of refugees until there are political, economic and social condition in East Pakistan that will inspire confidence among the refugees themselves.
All of these issues relate to the two clearly fundamental points you raise in your letter, that is, the part we might be able to play to encourage reconciliation between the two wings of Pakistan and to contribute to the outlook for peace among the countries of South Asia. These purposes are fundamental to our policies in South Asia. We believe that any progress toward their accomplishment requires that we seek actively to maintain co-operative relationships with both India and Pakistan. We cannot dictate to either how they should solve their problems and we must recognize the limits on our influence. But we believe it is only through keeping a substantive relationship with each of them that we can be effective in counseling restraint and encouraging resolution of the great problems that have so often divided these two countries and endangered peace in the subcontinent.
I know that officers of the Department directly concerned would be happy to meet with you or your staff if you would want elaboration on any, of these points. Please feel free to call on us to this effect whenever the Department can be of help.
Harrison M. Symmes,
Acting Assistant Secretary for
Congressional Relations.