বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্র (পঞ্চদশ খণ্ড)/১৮
ডঃ কামাল হোসেন
Loss of men and territory in the 1965, with no gain to show for it, had already brought down Ayub's stock with the Punjabi army, since sizeable chunks of inhabited areas lost, as well as men, were Punjabi. The Tashkent Declaration through which Ayub attempted to salvage the situation and obtain restoration of territories, instead of retrieving his own position, did further damage to in since to the Punjabis, the Tashkent Declaration was presented as a ‘sell out’ a measure of appeasement towards India conceded under Soviet pressure. Bhutto, who by many, and indeed his own accounts, had been one of the men responsible for pushing Ayub into the unfortunate war, not only ‘managed to escape from public censure for such a role, but also began to identify himself with the anti Tashkent sentiment and to dissociate himself from it. The old Punjabi Politicians, who had been sitting is out in the wings since 1958 saw in this situation an opportunity to align themselves with a discontented army, together to undermine Ayub.
In the Easter wing, the Bengalis had reacted entirely differently to the war. They had experienced a sense of total isolation, and felt ‘exposed’ and undefended. It was little consolation to be told by Bhutto that the eastern wings security had been left to assurances extended by the friendly Chinese. The Tashkent Declaration was therefore widely welcomed by almost all sections of the people in the Last.
The Punjabi politicians became active in early 1966, seeking to rally opposition forces behind a demand for political concessions from Ayub and the formation of a ‘national government’ They realised that pressure on Ayub would be truly effective if the Bengalis could be associated with this demand. Their keenness to involve Sheikh Mujib was recounted by Manik Mia (Tafazzal Hussain), the influential editor of the largest circulation Bengali daily Ittefaq. He had attended a meeting of Punjab opposition leaders in Lahore in early 1966. The assembled Punjabi leaders had urged a common opposition front to be formed against Ayub and assured that they were ‘confident that the army would not stand in their way, giving the impression that the spoke on the basis of contacts with the army, they wanted Manik Mia to persuade Sheikh Mujib to join this front. But Manik Mia knew that the question which would be put to him in Dacca was whether a change from Ayub to a central government consisting of another set of Punjabi leaders could redress the accumulated injustices suffered by the Bengalis. He therefore pointedly asked whether those present would agree to proposals for transfer of the capital, or one of the services headquarters to East Bengal or to replace parity on representation with representation on the basis of population. To this question the reply offered was, “Let us wrest away power from Ayub, and then we will see how to see about distributing it among ourselves.”
The Bengalis had not forgotten that these politicians had in their day, in the first decade of Pakistan systematically discriminated Against the Bengalis. ‘One-Unit’ and ‘Parity’ had been their brain-child. There was, therefore, some skepticism about the advantage to East Bengal of forming a common front of the kind proposed. Such a front could have some appeal for Bengalis if certain specific prior commitments were made to the Bengalis on the question of province-centre relationships, or in other words, on the question of regional autonomy which the Bengalis demanded.
Soon after Manik Mia’s return, Ayub came to Dacca at the end of January. Ile invited the Bengali opposition leaders to meet him. Among the leaders who were invited apart from Sheikh Mujib, then president of the Awami league, were a number of the ‘old guard’ leaders. Nurul Amin Yosuf Ali Chowdhury, Hamidul Huq Chowdhury and others. In informal consolations prior to a meeting Ayub, Sheikh Mujib decided to press the other Bengali leaders to agree to a common charter of demands to present to Ayub. He further pressed that in this carter there should be included a number of specific points defining the quantum of autonomy which the Bengalis considered to be essential for securing their interest. This was the occasion on which a number of specific points were put down on paper. Tajuddin Ahmed who was then the General Secretary of the Party, put these points down on paper. Sheikh Mujib pressed Nurul Amin to commit himself to them. Nurul Amin And the older leaders baulked at putting forward what they regarded as too radical a demand for a degree of autonomy which would be a ‘red rag’ to Ayub. This according to them, would reduce the chances of Ayub conceding to more ‘moderate’ demands such as ‘democratisation of the Constitution’, through introduction of direct elections on the basis of universal adult franchise, parliamentary form of Government and association of opposition elements in ‘national government’ Sheikh Mujib was firm and stated that if they were not going to commit themselves to those points-the precursor of the six points- he would present these himself. The meeting itself with Ayub ended in fiasco, since Hamidul Huq Chowdhury, who claimed to lead off as the spokesmen on behalf of the Bengali leaders was quickly disowned by Sheikh Mujib. Ayub left without any serious discussion taking place.
The Punjabi opposition leaders convened a national conference of opposition leaders in Lahore on 3 February Sheikh Mujib was among the Bengali leaders who were invited to attend Manik Mia pressed him to attend, for it was realised on all sides that his absence would mean that the most effective opposition force in the East was not represented at the conference. Manik Mia continued to urge moderation and attempted to persuade Sheikh Mujib not to press the specific point on autonomy. Sheikh however, remained determined to press these point.
At the Lahore conference when Sheikh attempted to present his ‘six point’ programme, Chowdhury Mohammed Ali, who was in the chair ruled it out of order. He would not even allow it to be included in the agenda. It was loudly whispered that the ‘six point’ programme was something which was being introduced with the ‘encouragement’ of the Government to divide the opposition leaders and to prevent opposition unity.
Sheikh Mujib upon being denied the opportunity to present his proposals to the conference, walked out and released the text of this statement to the press. The assembled opposition leaders were furious but realized that the Bengalis as represented by Sheikh, would not go along with them in the absence of a prior commitment on the quantum of autonomy. The Lahore meeting, therefore, broke up with a clear division having emerged between the Punjabi ladders (with feeble support from old guard Bengali leaders on the one hand) and Sheikh Mujib representing the emerging Bengali nationalism, which expressed itself in a demand for substantial regional autonomy.
The Government was quick to appreciate and exploit the situation. By highlighting that a militant nationalist trend represented by Sheikh Mujib and his six point had emerged among the Bengalis the Government sought not only to discredit the Punjabi opposition leaders as much for their failure to forge a united east west opposition front as for betraying the Punjabi interest by association witch Sheikh Mujib whose six points presented a grave threat to that interest the government in this way aimed once again to restore unity among the west Pakistani (Punjab) ruling clite which had become divided and a section of which was seeking to secure its interest through an opposition role.
The fact the Government could exploit this situation to its advantage has led to the unfounded allegation, made by such persons as Bhutto and S.M. Zafar, Ayub's Law Minister that Sheikh Mujib had been influenced by persons close to the government to present third programme so as to wreck opposition unity. This allegation was palpably false as the savage repression by the Ayub government of the six point movement was to demonstrate.
The six point formula was set out in a written statement which was to have been placed before the Lahore conference. This statement was published under the title six point formula—Our Right to Live by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on 23 March 1966. It was presented as a statement of basic principles of affirms solution of the countries inter wing political and economic problems it was emphasized that these demands were no new points invented afresh by me or any individual, but are in reality long standing demands of the people and pledges of their leaders awaiting fulfillment for decades.
The six point as formulated in this statement were:
Point 1: The Constitution should provide for a federation of Pakistan in its true sense on the basis of the Lahore Resolution, and parliamentary form of government with supremacy of legislature directly elected on the basis of universal adult franchise
Point 2: Federal Government shall deal with only two subjects, viz: Defiance and foreign affairs and all other residuary subjects shall vest in the federation States
Point 3: Either of the two following measures (should be adopted) with regard to currency:
A. Two separate but freely convertible currencies for the two wings may be introduced, or
B. One currency for the whole country may be maintained. In this case, effective constitutional provisions are to be made to stop flight of capital from East to west Pakistan. Separate Banking Reserve is to be made and separate fiscal and monetary policy to be adopted for East Pakistan.”
Point 4: Power of taxation and revenue collection shall vest in the federation units and the Federal center shall have no shall power. The Federation shall have a share in the state taxes for meeting their required expenditure. The Consolidated Federal Fund shall come out of a levy of certain percentage of all state taxes.
Point 5: (1) There shall be two separate accents of foreign exchange earnings of the two wings:
(2) Earning of East Pakistan shall be under the control of the East Pakistan Government and that of West Pakistan under the control of the West Pakistan Government
(3) Foreign exchange requirement of the Federal Government shall be met by the two wings either equally or in a ration to be fixed;
(4) Indigenous products shall move free of duty between two wings:
(5) The Constitution shall empower the unit governments to establish trade and commercial relations with set up trade missions in and enter into agreements with foreign countries
Point 6: A militia or Para military force shall be set up for East Pakistan
Point No. 1 gave expression to the basic demand for a parliamentary form or government to which almost everyone was committed. It acquired special significance in the context of the fact that in 1966. Ayub was governing under constitution which provided for an all powerful president in a presidential form of government. The demand for a federation on the basis of the Lahore resolution underlined the important point that the Resolution had contemplated that the Muslim majority provinces would be constituted into Sovereign autonomous states The Resolution thus provided the basis for the claim that the constituent units of Pakistan as envisaged by that resolution would be sovereign from this it followed that any association between them cloud only be on the basis of an agreement freely and voluntarily arrived at any federation which they agreed to form would be of such character as they agreed to give to it. There could be on preconceived model which could be thrust on them. Any federal government would only have such powers as were conferred on them by the sovereign constituent units. The sovereign units were free to concede as much as little to a federal government and could not be compelled to cede more to it than they consented to. In forming a federation the situation would not be one of previously unitary system being transformed into a federal one, through devolution of certain powers on organs of the constituent units as had taken place in British India under the Government of India Act, 1935 but a true federation where the constituent units by their common consent created a federal government by ceding, to it or conferring on it some of its powers.
This basic position was perhaps deliberately obscured in the twenty four years following the partition of India in 1947, when those who took it upon themselves to impose a constitution for Pakistan stood things on their head by thinking in term of grants of power to the provinces and not of sovereign constituent units granting powers to any federal government which may be established by common agreement conferring power on that government. No doubt the ruling minority which had acquired control over the Central government vested with substantial powers as were granted to the central government under the Government of India Act 1935, found it in its own interest to protect this position. Indeed their consistent effort was to strengthen the position of the central government even further in the name of national integration. Indeed the Indian Independence act had provided that until the Constituent Assembly framed a Constitution of Pakistan (as also India) the government of India and would operate as a provisional constitution and provide the framework for relations between provinces and the center contributed towards obscuring the fact that the constituent units were in principle sovereign and not provinces enjoying devolved powers handed down by some all powerful center, as historically had been true of British India before 1947.
Point No. 2 Provided for a two subject center or if currency were to be included a three subject center. The antecedents of this demand were there In the Cabinet Mission Plat of 1946, which proposed a three subject centre entrusted only with Defiance Foreign Affairs and Communication. The Grand National Assembly of Democratic Forces a convention of political groups, in opposition to the government, which met in Decca in early 1950 also proposed a federation, called the United States of Pakistan, in which the center would only deal with three subjects Defense foreign Affairs and Communications The United Front which had been formed by the opposition parties to contest the ruling Muslim League in the provincial elections in East Bengal in 1954, had as one of the points on its 21 point manifesto that the constitution should provide for a federation in which the center would only have three subjects: defense, foreign affairs and currency. Thus the second point in the six point formula was a reiteration of a point which had been adopted as one of the basic points relating to the constitution viz. distribution of powers between the centre and the provinces under a federal constitution.
Point No. 3, 4 and 5 were specifically aimed at securing for the region, for the Bengalis, control over their own resources and the powers of managing the economy. The feeling that East Bengal, despite being the powers of managing the economy. The feeling that East Bengal, despite being the majority province was not obtaining a fair deal was widely shared since the earliest days of Pakistan. Initially there was a feeling of being discriminated against in the allocation of federal fund, in the allocation of foreign exchange and in the matter of recruitment to public services by the central government. The conviction grew that Est. Bengal was not getting its due. From the middle of the fifties through the sixties this view was given sharper definition through statistical demonstration of economic disparity in the writings of Bengali economists. These writings had highlighted the discriminatory policies which had resulted in the marked disparity in the economic development of the two wings of Pakistan, the East having been prejudiced by systematic discrimination in favors of the western wing.
The principal instrument through which a substantial transfer of resources from the eastern to the western wing had taken place was perceived to be federal control over economic management. The main thrust of the six point scheme was therefore to regionalize economic management.
The germ of the six point proposal as early as 1962 in a pamphlet entitled The Challenge of Disparity Published in Dacca. It had urged that the only practical measures to redress disparity would be certain basic institutional changes which it outlined as follows: dismantling the central planning Commission and replacing it by two powerful regional planning bodies, and the bifurcation of the ministries of Finance and Economic Affairs. It was even suggested that aid requirements should be separately assessed region wise and that the regional bodies should actively participate in forming foreign aid policy. In this recommendation was the seeds of the idea of regionalizing economic management i.e. transfer to the regions of the power to tax, the power to make fiscal and monetary policy, the power to plan and control resources and to conduct foreign economic relations.
The analysis of the economists had shown that the main instruments through which transfer of resources had been made from eastern to the western wing were control over foreign trade, foreign exchange and foreign aid, The foreign exchange earned thorough exports of jute products from the east was consistently allocated for the economic development (including industrialization) of the western wing. Projects in the castern wing were not promoted with the foreign aid agencies with the same vigour as were project in the western wing vast investments in irrigation, agriculture and industries of the western wing had kept on widening the disparity between the two wings.
It is important to understand this since when ultimately the six point formula was proposed, the most unyielding resistance which was offered to it related to the points involving forcign trade and aid. The western ruling clite were not prepared to relinquish the instruments through which they had been able to dominate the economy.
Ayub's reaction, therefore, to the six point programme, was to repress it with force. He leveled the six point programme as a scheme for secession and declared that he would respond to it with the language of weapons”.
Sheikh Mujib and Awami League, sensing the mood of the Bengalis, took the six point programme to the people and a mass movement began to grow in its support. On April 18 Sheikh Mujib was arrested and on May 9 he was placed in detention under the Defense of Pakistan Rules. On June 7, 1966, a special protest day was observed in support of the six point movement. Ayub's Government moved to suppress it with force. The demonstration was fired upon, claiming a number of lives. Large-scale arrests followed and the newspaper which was the main spokesman of the Bengalis, the daily `Ittefaq` was closed down its editor arrested and its press forfeited.
In the face of such repression, the movement faced a setback. The initial response was to make these matters to court through writ petitions in the High Court.
At the end of December 1967 the atmosphere suddenly became tense and the air was filled with rumors. Ayub Khan who was visiting the Eastern wing was due to visit the Dawood complex in Chandraghona in the Chittagong Hill tracts suddenly cancelled his visit. It was given out that the cancellation was due to apprehension of an assassination or kidnapping plot. That the cancellation had been a last minute one was evident from the fact that Chittagong and the road to Chandraghona had been suitably decorated for the presidential motorcade: but no motorcade had passed that route.
Sometime in the last week of December a barrister colleague of mine, Amirul Islam reported that he had interviewed a client in jail who complained of having been subjected to severe torture and bore marks of torture on his person. He said that while subjected to torture he was pressed to implicate persons in a conspiracy case Amirul Islam was very worried and sought advice as to what he should do. It was suggested to him that steps should be taken immediately to bring this to the attention of the High court and press for a medical board to examine the person. The same evening a petition was prepared to the High court alleging torture and asking for a medical board to examine the victim. The petition created great interest, and the court was persuaded to constitute a medical board. The person in question was Kamaluddin Ahmad, who later was to be approver No. ‘1 in the Agartala Conspiracy Case’.
A few days later a series of arrests started. Ahmed Fazlur Rahman, Ruhul Quddus, Shamsur Rahman, all senior Bengali members of the Pakistan civil service and a number of Bengali armed forces personnel were arrested. Ahmed Fazlur Rahman was the first of the Agartala Conspiracy case accused to seek a lawyers interview, and named me as his lawyer. I met him in jail at the end of the last week of December 1967 or the first week of January 1968. He reported that immediately after his arrest he had been taken to a flat in the new residential arca of Bonani in Dacca, where he was continuously interrogated of several days. The interrogators wanted him to implicate persons in a conspiracy case. While these arrests continued the atmosphere continued to grow tense. Indeed even lawyers acting for the arrested persons felt vulnerable to arrest. A habeas corpus application was moved for Ahmed Fazlur Rahman. The same day Barrister K.Z. Alam approached me to move an application on behalf of Lieutenant Commander Moazzem. He was advised that different lawyers should appear for each of the arrested persons as a common legal front would tend to show links between these person, an impression which should be avoided in a conspiracy case. Ishtiaq Ahmed had then taken up Lieutenant Commander Moazzems case. Kamaluddin Hossain, Ruhul Quddus brother-in-law, had taken up the petition for Ruhul Quddus. When the petition was moved in the high court, the government lawyers appeared and stated that some investigations were proceeding against these persons. The first of the Government press reports issued in carly January did not name Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as an accused. It was the official press release on January 20, which for the first time named Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as the principal accused.
For the next five months the entire case was covered by a blanket of secrecy. No information was given about the location of the accused who had by then been shifted from jail and placed in military custody. An Ordinance was promulgated to provide for trial by a Special Tribunal. The special tribunal consisted of S.A. Rahman Judge of the Supreme Court, and two Bengali High Court Judges. MR. Khan and Maksumul Hakim. The trial seemed political from the very beginning. The main evidence presented was the testimony of approvers who, when produced at the trial, alleged torture and tended to turn into hostile witnesses.
Some time after the trial had commenced, Tom Williams QC MP, a British barrister engaged by Bengalis in London, arrived in Dhaka to join the team of defense counsel. Since there was already a full team of trial lawyers led by Salam Khan it was arranged that tom Williams should conduct the cross examination in the trial for one or two days and that thereafter he would serve a writ petition in the High Court. I was associated with Williams in the preparation of the writ petition and drafted the petition. The petition was moved by Williams and a rule was issued by the High Court. The High Court, however, declined to make any interim order. In the meantime Williams complained of being continuously Shadowed by Ayub's police and intelligence men. His car was being followed and worse was to come later when his room was broken into and his luggage and papers ransacked. He was also served with a demand for payment of income tax having spent about a week and suffered much harassment, it was agreed that tom Williams shoals return to England. His visit and participation in the case had served the purpose of drawing international attention to the case. Peter Hazlehurst the new correspondent of the Times (London) helped in this by sending a series of reports on the case and in particular the harassments to which tom Williams had been subjected.
The progress of the case and the daily publication of the verbatim proceedings of the trial sustained a high degree of popular interest in the case. If the Ayub Government had thought that this case would discredit Sheikh Mujib, it had cxactly the opposite effect. It generated sympathy as Sheikh Mujib presented the image of a leader who was being victimized for championing the cause of the Bengali people. The grievances of the Bengalis also received extensive publicity and contributed towards heightening their sense of injustices.
Ayub had been seriously ill in the early part of 1968, and this had served to weaken his grip on the administration. Speculation about a possible successor had begun. The Army Commander in Chief and ambitious men in the wings like Bhutto. Saw in Ayub's debility an opportunity for themselves.
Towards the end of 1968, with grievances accumulating in both wings objective conditions were ripe for poplar movement of against Ayub. In November 1968 police action against students in Peshawar triggered off demonstrations in which some students were injured. Bhutto, then present in Rawalpindi, capitalized on this incident and a popular agitation began to develop.
Towards the end of 1968, at the end of a public meeting, Maulana Bhashani gave a call for a hartal (strike) on the following day. The herbal was widely observed and had a tremendous affect in galvanizing popular forces in the eastern wing. Political leaders met to decide further steps they should take and decided to call a province wise herbal on December 13. Maulanas attempt to call for herbal on December 8 did not prove to be a success. At a time when the proclamation of emergency was in force in the country with the full vigor of the military to back it and with the entire resources of the government deployed to frustrate the herbal its total success demonstrated the extent of popular opposition to the government. The people obviously were ready for a movement. The students who had always been the militant and activist elements responded rapidly to this situation and organized themselves to lead a popular movement.
A Student Action Committee was formed with representatives of leading student organization in East Pakistan. It was the formation of this Committee that brought Tofael Ahmed, the Vice President of the Dacca University Central Students Union (DUCSU) into prominence as he became the convener of this Committee.
The Students Action Committee produced an 11 point charter of demands. Indeed, a breakdown of the 11 point programme would show that under point No. 1 alone more than 15 separate demands relating to separate aspects of education were included, ranging from “Tuition fees must be reduced by 50 per cent,” “polytechnic students must be offered facilities of a condensed course,” to such general demands as “the mother tongue must be used as medium of instruction at all levels of education” and “education must be made compulsory and free up to class VIII.” These were followed by a comprehensive charter of political and economic demands. The substance of the Six-Point programme of the Awami League was fully embodied though with some interesting changes in formulation. It also called for full regional autonomy to be given to former provinces and for formation of a sub Federation in the withdrawal of the Agartala Conspiracy case was also demanded. In foreign affairs there was a demand for quitting CENTO, SEATO and “Pakistan-US Military Pacts” and to formulate a “neutral and independent foreign policy.” In the economic sphere nationalization of banks insurance companies and all majored industries including jute was demanded. For the peasants reduction of tax and land revenue was called for and a demand was included for writing off arrears of land and loans outstanding form peasants. The minimum price of Rupees 40 per mound of jute was demanded for industrial workers fair wages and various welfare benefits were demanded together with repeal of “anti-worker black laws” Flood control measures were also demanded. The 11 point programme of students thus became a comprehensive charter of demands and with that before them, the students launched their movement.
Such a comprehensive charter of demands was significant on more counts than one. The inclusion of the substance of the six-point programmers meant that these were not only the demands made by one political party but that these had enlisted support form all the major student groups having divergent political affiliation and thus had become the basic political demand of the entire people of East Pakistan. By spelling out the economic demands the students were ensuring that any successful political struggle must also bring about economic salvation of the people which lay in the adoption of socialistic measures. The foreign policy element in the charter also set the goal for the country to make an independent and non aligned course.
The political leaders, in the meantime, were also holding meeting to charter out courses of action and were maintaining close contact with the students with Sheikh Mujib and the front rank Awami League leaders in jail, it was left to syed Nazrul Islam to represent the party in deliberation with other opposition leaders. Following a successful hartal on January 6, the opposition leaders both the cast and the west wing representing the Awami League. National Awami Party (Requisitionist). KSP. Awami League (PDM), Council Muslim League, Jamal-i-Islam, Nizam-e-Islam and the National Democratic Front-met on January 10 in Dacca.
I returned from a meeting of the Central Bar Council in Karachi to find that the leaders were still finding it difficult to agree upon a common charter of demands. The main obstacle to agreement arose from unwillingness of the Punjabi leaders to endorse the six point autonomy formula. There was also reluctance to press for withdrawal of the Agartala Conspiracy case. The Awami League leaders insisted upon the inclusion of these points in the common charter as a condition for their participation in the Democratic Action Committee which was proposed to be set up.
These deliberations among the opposition leaders of the two wings reflected the divergence in the aims of the political leaders of the two wings. This divergence was glossed over at this stage by including a common demand for a “federal parliamentary Government.” The point programme on the basis of which the students had launched their popular movement however had already incorporated the substance of the six-point programme as an integral part of their programme.
The popular movement continued to escalate. The Democratic Action Committee which had been formed called a “National Protest Day” on January protest Day on January 17. It had decided it necessary to violate any order prohibiting processions under section 144 of the Criminal procedure code. Indeed the Democratic Acton Committee Leaders assembled in front of Bait-ul-Mukaarram in the center of the city and symbolically violated the Order under Section 144. This was significant enough since it was the first time that political leaders committed to constitutional politics had, by a deliberate act violated the lea. Students who represented the militant wing of the popular movement were not content with symbolic defiance. A massive procession of students set out from the University and was confronted by the police, who opened fire. An young student, Asad, was killed. The blood of martyrs is the most powerful fuel for popular movements. After Asad had laid down his life the leadership of the movement virtually rested with the students action Committee rather that the DAC. The agitation intensified throughout the eastern wing and despite the fact that a proclamation of emergency was still in force massive demonstrations and processions became the order of the day. Police firing claimed further young lives and the military were deployed to aid the police. Practically every order of the law enforcing agencies was met with defiance, the curfew imposed in the cities was violated every now and then and, in some cases, a kind of resistance was put up against the army. In their attempt to enforce law and order the army resorted to indiscriminate firing that killed among others a schoolboy in a procession, a housewife in her home, a child on her mother’s lap and a university teacher within the premises of his campus. The government had completely collapsed in the face of intense agitation. In the countryside the local action committees had virtually replaced the law enforcing agencies. In the urban areas the student leaders were invited to settle disputes between the management and the laborers who were demanding higher wages and better working conditions.
The popular agitation in the western wing had also been gathering momentum. It was clear that Ayub's government which had only a few months ago celebrated the completion of decade of progress under the armymen was now under heavy pressure from all corners to meet the demands of the people.
It was about this time that I into contact in connection with a court case with Manzoor Quader, who was in Dacca as the chief prosecutor in the Agartala Conspiracy case. Since he appeared to be disturbed by the mounting agitation. I took the opportunity to urge upon him that the Ayub Government should read the writing on the walls and concede to the popular demands rather than be guilty of offering the people too little too late He reacted by saying that he would press Ayub to concede to popular demands, but having said this fell back to a defence of the 1962, Constitution of which he was the architect. He went to the launching of the present agitation and thus seemed to claim credit for the popular awakening.
Ayub khan faced with this situation announced in his first-of-the month broadcast on February 1, 1969 that he would invite opposition political leaders for talks. These proposed talks soon came to be described as the ‘Round table conference’. Ayub addressed a letter to Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan as representing the Democratic Action committee to invite opposition leaders for talks in Rawalpindi on February 17, 1969.
This move was seen as demonstrating the strength of the popular movement and the growing weakness of Ayub. The Democratic action committee called for lifting of the martial law and release of all political prisoners as a condition precedent for coming to the negotiation table. In this context the withdrawal of the Agartala Conspiracy case and the release of Sheikh Mujib acquired particular urgency. The most important component of the Democratic Action Committee in the East, the Awami League made in clear that withdrawal of the case and release of Sheikh Mujib would be for them the minimum condition for joining the talks.
The Punjabi leaders of the Democratic Action committee and indeed some of the old guard Bengali leaders showed some ambivalence about pressing for withdrawal of the Agartala Conspiracy case and release of Sheikh Mujib. In discussion with Awami League, they hinted at legal difficulties and urged that the release of Sheikh Mujib and withdrawal of Agartala conspiracy case could be secured during the talks. It was clear that their opposition stemmed mainly from their realization that Sheikh Mujib's participation meant that the six-point programme would become central to any negotiated political settlement. It was however realised, particularly by the other Bengali leaders that any attempt on their part to arrive at a settlement by passing the six point demands of Sheikh Mujib, would be repudiated by the Bengali people and leave them completely compromised Awami league continued to be firm about Sheikh Mujib's release as a precondition for participation. Under such pressure, the Democratic Action committee raised this matter with Ayub. Ayub parried by saying that since Sheikh Mujib was under trial there were “legal difficulties” involved.
I was in close touch with the opposition leaders and in particular with Manik Mia, Editor of the daily ‘Ittefaq’. Having come close to him since June 1966 when he had been detained and the Ittefaq had been closed down and I had been engaged to take up these matters in the high court. Manik Mia's house was the meeting place of the opposition leaders and in particular of the political and student leaders. Manik Mia attached importance to Sheikh Mujib's release and to his participation in the Round Table Conference. In discussion with him I indicated that legal maneuvers could be initiated to assail the and thereby create further pressure for the release of Sheikh Mujib.
While all this was under way, I received a massage that Sheikh Mujib wanted me to come to the court room, where the trail was taking place. I hastened on the following day to meet him in the Court Room. Sheikh Mujib appeared disturbed by the position adopted by Abdul Salam khan, his chief defense counsel, who represented the break away (PDM) wing of the Awami league. Salam khan had begun to press Sheikh Mujib not to insist on withdrawal of the case or his release as precondition for Awami leagues participation in the round Table Conference. He had it appeared even extended a veiled threat that he would not be able to conduct the defense further if Sheikh maintained a “rigid position” Sheikh Mujib was angered by this and urged that I should formally enter appearance as a defense counsel and should also pursue legal steps to assail the trial. He also agreed that steps might be taken obtain assistance from A, K. Brohi, who had appeared in the Ittefaq case. I acted on these instructions.
With the movement acquiring greater and greater strength, the police and indeed Governor Monem Khan and his civil administration itself Bengal to recede into the background. It was General Muzaffaruddin, the General Officer Commanding, who began conspicuously to appear as the representative of the Islamabad authorities. It also seemed that Yahya. The commander in Chief of the army had begun to seek a direct appreciation of the situation in the east through his General Officer Commanding. I recall Muzaffaruddin in a meeting in January with Manik Miah impressing on him that Yahya had asked for an appreciation of the situation from him and he also believed that a political solution should be attempted. He undertook to convey any views that were expressed to Yahya. It seemed very significant that Yahya, who was commander-in-chief had already began to take what appeared to be independent initiatives. The importance of the withdrawal of the Agartala conspiracy case so that Sheikh Mujib would be free and only then could negotiations for a political settlement commence, was impressed upon the Genera Muzaffaruddin almost within 24 hours. Reported that he pad conveyed to Yahya the points made to him and that Yahya had indicated that if a legal way could be found for Sheikh Mujib's release, this could be considered.
I was urged by Manik Mia t take legal measures to assail the trial with this end in view, I flew for Karachi for legal consultations with Broil and arrived in Karachi on February 14, on which a nation-wide hartal was being observed, and was impressed to see that life was completely paralyzed in Karachi, I had to walk on foot from my hotel to Brohi's residence. Brohi readily agreed to help in formulating a legal attack on the trial but said that he must come to Dacca to examine all the papers including the evidence so far recorded in the case. I flew to Dacca the same evening and Brohi arrived the following morning. After going through the papers, it was found that a strong that a strong point was available to challenge the legal validity of the trial. By now it was clear that the proclamation of emergency was being revoked. Upon the revocation of that Proclamation, the fundamental rights provisions of the 1962 Constitution would once again become operative. As soon as this happened, it would be argued that the trial could not proceed on the ground that the special tribunal with its special procedures, violated the fundamental right guaranteeing equality before the law and cqual protection of the law to all citizens. A notice was therefore drawn up to be served on the government calling upon it to withdraw the case and to release Sheikh Mujib and other accused Brohi together and myself personally handed over this notice to Manzoor Quader. Manzoor Quader considered that there was substance in the point raised and undertook immediately to contact Ayub on the telephone.
While this matter was being discussed with Manzoor Quader he received a telephone call and appeared visibly agitated at what was reported to him over the telephone. He informed that he had just been told that Sgt. Zahurul Haque on of the accused in the Agartala conspiracy case, had been shot dead by a military guard and that two other accused persons had been injured. His agitation showed that he understood the gravity of the situation. It was clear that there would be popular outrage when this news would be revealed. I was personally very upset because Sgt. Zahurul Haque was the brother of a friend and colleague, Advocate Aminul Haque, who had indeed only a few days earlier, obtained my commitment to appear to present arguments on behalf of his brother. The urgency of the need for compliance with the notice served on him was impressed on Manzoor Quader.
Zahurul Haque's funeral was fixed for the afternoon. Immediately after the janaza (funeral prayers) at Paltan, I accompanied by a number of friends, left for the Azimpur burial-ground. At least two hours had passed and the body still did not arrived. This had begun to cause concern. It was learnt that the precisionists, while trying to get some flowers form the garden of a minister's house occupied by the ministers and followed it with attacks on other official residences, including one occupied by the presiding judge of the of Agartala Conspiracy case and set them on fire.
Immediately after the burial, I proceeded to the hotel where Brohi was staying and witnessed many houses burning on the way. I found Manzoor Quader with Brohi. He said that he had already spoken to Rawalpindi but had received no reply. Manzoor Quader was emphatic that the trial could no longer continue in view of the popular emotions released by the death of Zahurul IIaque, which had already led to the burning of the residence of the presiding judge. Manzoor Quader claimed that it was no longer realistic to expect that the trial could continue. He even made a philosophic point namely that the object of trial was to convince the public that accused persons were guilty and that therefore justice demanded that they be punished. In a case, where the public had already made up its mind that the accused were not only not guilty but were ‘heroes’, as was evident from their behavior there was little point in continuing with the trial. It was agreed that both Manzoor Quader and Brohi would leave for Rawalpindi the following morning and pursue the matter of the legal notice served on the Government to withdraw proceeding and to release Sheikh Mujib and the other accused persons. Two days had already passed and no response had been received. Brohi had left for Karachi and Informed me over the telephone that the notice was still being studied by the Law ministry.
Obviously the Round Table Conference could not start on 17 February and in view of the mounting tension I was urged to travel to Rawalpindi to make further efforts to secure the release of Sheikh Mujib. Tajuddin Ahmed, who had just been released from jail, Amirul Islam and myself reached Rawalpindi on 17 February. An air of crisis prevailed since Sheikh Mujib had not been released and consequently the Democratic Action Committee was unable to sit at the conference table with Ayub Manzar Bashir, an Advocate, who was associated with the opposition volunteered to see the Law Minister Zafar late at night to find out the position. I was informed almost at midnight that he could see Zafar the next morning. Zafar made some noises about “legal difficulties” but when pressed to respond to the legal notice, he said it was not only a matter of law but of a political decision at the highest level.
It was impressed upon him that the notice merited a clear reply and that on should be given without further delay. He said the matter was being considered by the cabinet the same morning and that he would let me have a reply by mid day he also asked for a further notice or a summary of the notice to be given to him. Within an hour a fresh notice was sent to him at around 12.30 Zafar telephoned me to say that he would meet him at the hotel where he was staying. He came and reported that after protracted discussion the Cabinet had decided in the negative namely that they could not accede to the demand contained in the notice my reaction was one of indignation which I shared with Manzoor Quader, who appeared on the scene. IIc, too, expressed displeasure at the negative attitude of the Government. He said he would talk to me later in the afternoon and then he began to talk to Zafar.
That afternoon Manzoor Quader telephoned to ask me to see him in his room in the same hotel. He had barely entered his room when Zafar arrived. They (Manzoor Quader and Zafar) then proposed that the government was ready to make an announcement that Sheikh Mujib could join the round table conference as a free man when asked to clarify the legal position Zafar was reticent and said that this was the only formula which he could persuade the government to accept. They urged that I should convey this to Sheikh Mujib.
Tajuddin, Amirul Islam and myself flew to Dacca via Lahore & Karachi, as that was the only route by which Dacca could be reached by the following morning. We were met by Asghar Khan at the airport at Lahore and Brohi at the airport in Karachi. Manzoor Quader had assured me before departure that he would try to see Ayub in the course of the evening once again to press him to accept the demand contained in the notice.
It was the night of the 18/19 February. A telephone fall was made to Manzoor Quader from the Karachi airport Manzoor Quader explained that he had been sitting throughout the evening to meet Ayub but was told that Ayub was engaged in a meeting. He expressed his amazement at the fact that Ayub was still closeted in a meeting even though it was past midnight. He said that was perhaps the only time when he had wanted to see Ayub and been unable to do so. He confided that in the circumstances it seemed that some very extra ordinary meeting was taking place.
It later transpired that this was the fateful meeting in which Ayub had called in his three service chiefs. Ayub urged the service chiefs to support proclamation of martial law and the deployment of the military to suppress the popular movement. The service chiefs refused to go along. Obviously Ayub bad become a political liability and as events were to show, Yahya had his own ambitions. If the army had to be used to suppress the people, it would do so to serve the aims of Yahya and the coterie around him and not those of Ayub and his collapsing Government.
Yahya's adviser has corroborated this version of evidence when he reported on the meetings between Ayub and the armed forces leaders in February 1969 as follows:
As I gathered from Yahya himself after I joined his cabinet in 1969, a series of meetings between Ayub and the top armed forces leaders took place in February 1969. This account was also substantiated by General Akbar and by some members of the presidential House staff, who can sometimes provide a better account of the “inside story”. The chiefs of the Army, Air force and Navy and their aides had joint and separate meeting with Ayub. The most crucial meeting took place in mid February when the three chiefs (General Yahya, Air Marshal Nur Khan and Vice Admiral Ahsan) were to tell Ayub to work for “a political Settlement” and not to rely on the military forces to suppress the revolutionary movement. The most interesting part of this crucial conference was: who was to break the unpleasant truth to the boss? There was pause hesitancy and silence. Ahsan of the Navy would not take the initiative, as he wanted to maintain his posture of neutrality; for Yahya it was a delicate time-Ayub had made him commander-in-Chief, by passing a few senior generals. Ultimately, the task fell to the outspoken chief of the Air force, Nur Khan. The army chiefs agreed to use the armed forces only to the minimum extent needed to keep the administration functioning and prevent the situation from being exploited by any foreign country presumably India.
I or Ayub the advice to seek a political solution must on doubt have come as a shock. After being the unchallenged chief of the armed forces for the last eighteen years (1950—46) he was being repudiated by them. He is reported to have told a visiting dignitary perhaps they are now tired of seeing my face
While this abortive encounter was taking place between Ayub and the service chiefs my colleagues and I were travelling to Dacca to report to Sheikh Mujib on what had transpired at Rawalpindi.
Immediately on arrival at the airport, Manik Mia received us and we proceeded to the Cantonment. When Sheikh Mujib was told of Zafar's proposal that he could proceed to Rawalpindi on the basis of an announcement that he was a “free man”, Sheikh Mujib immediately rejected this as an unacceptable proposition. He said how was it possible for him to leave on this basis as his position would be that of a fugitive from custody and people would be free to shoot him down as they had shot Zahurul Haque. He said a legal notice had already been served assailing the trial, and it was for them to accept it also he would not countenance walking out while the other accused remained in custody.
When I informed Genera Muzaffaruddin of this, he said that he should speak to Zafar over the telephone. Zafar was then told that the formula suggested by him was unacceptable to Sheikh Mujib and that whether he could accept the notice or the matter would be proceeded with in the high court and the high court could make an order of release. Zafar said that he would telephone after some time. He telephoned to say that the High court procedure would be time consuming and instead the Tribunal could be asked to sit and to grant an interim order to release Sheikh Mujib and this would be in the nature of a release on bail
Sheikh Mujib was informed of this development. He said that there was no question of his applying for bail. In the meantime, the two Bengali judges of the special tribunal had been brought to the Cantonment and also one of the prosecuting lawyers, who proposed that Sheikh Mujib may be released on bail. When my colleague, Amirul Islam, went to Sheikh Mujib to inform him of this development Sheikh Mujib firmly rejected the proposal to release him on bail. He was infuriated by a report which had been broadcast while Amirul was talking to him, to the effect that Sheikh Mujib was being released on bail.
Hearing that Sheikh Mujib might be released that evening, thousands of people had started walking down the Airport Road to the cantonment, In view of Sheikh Mujib firm refusal to be released on bail, a military vehicle had rushed out with loudspeakers to inform the people that no release was taking place in that evening. In the meantime Khawja Sahabuddin and Admiral A.R. Khan, members of Ayub’s cabinet, had arrived in Dacca. As I was leaving Sheikh Mujib after reporting to him that we had told the tribunal of his position, Admiral A.R. Khan and Khawja Sahabuddin were seen entering to talk to Sheikh Mujib.
If was clear that Ayub was floundering in retrospect, it is evident that the service Chiefs had made it clear to him that a military option was not open to him. He therefore had to negotiate with political leaders. This option was only available to him if Sheikh Mujib would be released since negotiation excluding him would have little relevance so far as the eastern wing was concerned.
The next morning at about 11.30 the report spread through Dacca that Sheikh Mujib was released. They had fallen back on the formula which had been suggested a month earlier in the legal notice that the trial was constitutionally invalid and therefore the entire trial had to be abandoned.
Sheikh Mujib emerged as a great National Hero and the unquestioned leader of the mass movement which had development in East Bengal. He took the position that he would only consider going to Rawalpindi for the Round Table conference after he bad addressed the people in a public meeting pledged in Dacca and received their mandate. A mammoth public meeting of over a milling pledged their support to his six point autonomy demand and conferred on him the title of ‘Bangabandhu' (The friend of Bengal).
Sheikh Mujib then obtained from them a mandate to go to the Round table Conference, where he said that he should place the demands of the Bengali people. He pledged that if these demands were not accepted, he would return and continue the movement but would not compromise.
Sheikh Mujib accompanied by party leaders, left for Rawalpindi to join the opening session of the Round table Conference. I was asked to accompany the delegation by a curious coincidence, Bhutto and Sheikh Mujib were traveling by the same plane to Lahore. Bhutto and his colleagues were in the first class, while Sheikh Mujib and his delegation were in the economy class. This gave Sheikh an opportunity for the obvious dig that the Awami League was really the party of the people while the people’s party was the “big people’s party.” Bhutto had met Sheikh Mujib in Dacca, and taken the position that he would not go to the round table conference (RTC), as he felt that it was bound to fail. It is noteworthy in this context that Moulana Bhashani had taken the same position. I recall the meeting between Nawabzada Nasrullah and Maulana Bhashani in February when Maulana while reiterating that he would not go to the RTC, but he wished it success for if any good came out of it he would share in it He had then raised his hands and prayed for the Success Of RTC.
At Lahore airport separate groups had come to receive Bhutto and Sheikh Mujib. Among those to receive Sheikh Mujib were Air Marshal Asghar Khan and General Azam. Bhutto suggested that Sheikh Mujib should come down from the plane together with him. Those who had come to receive Sheikh opposed this. Bhutto therefore disembarked from the plane and boarded a truck which followed by a substantial crowd, left the airport. Sheikh Mujib and his party then came down and, followed by a very large crowd, left in a separate procession towards the city, where a short stop-over had been arranged.
The party reached Rawalpindi the same evening. A meeting of the Democratic Action Committee (DAC) was held but because of the constraints of time no substantive discussion could be held. The following morning the formal opening of the round table Conference took place. Since Eid-ul-Azha was in the offing and need was felt for consultations among participant it was agreed that the conference should be adjourned for about 10 days to reconvene on 10March. It was decided that the Democratic action Committee should meet in Lahore for a couple of days before the Round Table Conference was resumed in order to enable the participants to consult and formulate a common negotiating position.
On returning to Dacca, Sheikh Mujib suggested that I should sit with a working group of experts (mainly economists and other academics) to formulate constitutional proposals to give effect to the six point scheme. This was felt to be necessary to meet the criticism that the six point scheme was unworkable and that no viable federal structure could be designed around it. The working group held several meetings during which specific constitutional proposals and alternative negotiating positions were formulated. Attempts were made to anticipate the objections which would be raised and to prepare answers to them.
Sheikh Mujib left with his colleagues for Lahore on 6 March 1969. I was asked to join the delegation in Lahore and to proceed to Rawalpindi as an adviser. It was also supposed that Dr. Sarwar Murshid and Dr. Muzaffar Ahmed Chowdhury should be requested to join the delegation. Upon reaching Lahore it was learnt that it was proving difficult for agreement to be reached on a common charter of demand as a basic divergence was emerging between the leaders representing the different regions.
Sheikh Mujib had avoided attending the DAC meeting and stayed back in his hotel room on the ground of indisposition. In fact he was keeping away from the discussions, which were tending to run into an impasse as the Punjabi leaders were vigorously opposing the inclusion of the six point autonomy demand in the common charter of demands. It was argued by the Awami League supported by national Awami party that the agreed eight points of the democratic action committee covered both the questions of regional autonomy and the undoing of one unit, since the democratic action Committee had committed itself to a “federal parliamentary government.” It was urged that “federal”, character had to be spelt out and for that purpose it was necessary for the Democratic action committee to take a position on the question of regional autonomy and dissolution of one unit. Chowdhury Muhammad Ali a redoubtable Punjabi a former senior civil servant indeed a former prime minister consistently opposed the adoption of a common position on regional autonomy or dissolution of One unit when it was put to him that it was necessary to spell out what was meant by federal’ he countered by arguing that everyone knew what ‘federal' meant and in any case the meaning could be looked up on the Oxford Dictionary! Sheikh Mujib and the Awami Legue supported by the National Awami insisted on the inclusion of the six Points demand for autonomy in the common charter of demands as a condition for their participation in the Round Table Conference. They pointed out that the Conference had been convened under the pressure of a mass movement. This movement had articulated its constitutional demands which were set out in the 11 point programme. This included regional autonomy on the basis of the six-points formula and dissolution of One Unit.
As a result of such a polarization within the Democratic Action Committee a meeting of the East Pakistan Regional Democratic Action Committee was hurriedly convened at Chamber House. It was impressed upon all the Bengali representatives that given the state of public opinion in the East and the tempo of the 11 point movement the Bengalis at least should adopt a common position on Bengali demands and in particular the demands for full regional autonomy. A unanimous resolution was adopted making a five paint recommendation to the Central Democratic Action Committee Among these five points were full regional autonomy and dismemberment of one unit the central Democratic action Committee had set up a special committee to hammer out if possible a common position on had steadfastly opposed regional autonomy on the basis of Six points. Metaphysics and jurisprudence were invoked to argue that neither the Democratic Action Committee nor Ayub’s legislature had a mandate to deal with the question of regional autonomy. This was countered by the argument that the democratic action committee and the legislature had as much competence to deal with regional autonomy as it did to consider other constitutional amendments which were being proposed.
In the meantime i had thought it would be useful to strengthen the team of experts by the addition of economists. Dr. Anisur Rahman who was then professor of economics at Islamabad, was invited to join the teamin Lahore .He together with professor Wahidul Haque, who was also in Islamabad and Dr. Muzaffar Ahmed chowdhury, who had arrived from Dacca, joined the team on the following day.
Following the deadlock in the subcommittee, the Punjabi leaders, including Maulana Maudoodi, Mumtaz Daulatana and Chaudhury Muhammad Ali, came to Sheik Mujib's room in the evening on march 8, and passed that the ‘six-point' autonomy demand should not from part of the common charter of demands. Sheik Mujib was firm on the point that he and his party could not join the round table conference unless they could pass their demand for regional autonomy on the basis of the Six-Point formula. when some of the Punjabi leaders argued that the Six-Point scheme was unworkable, Sheikh Mujib said that he had brought with him experts who could sit with any experts which they (the Punjabi leaders) might nominate to discuss in detail the implications of the Six-Point formula. It was at that point that we sent for. A brief discussion was held between Chaudhir Muhammad Ali and some of Sheikh Mujib's experts. Chaudhri Mahammad Ali struck a posture that these issues were “too complex” for him and said that their said was not “lucky enough” to have to many experts.
A point of crisis was reached when the unyielding Punjabi leaders, adamant in their refusal to include the Six-Points autonomy formula in the common charter of demand, were confronted with an uncompromising Sheikh Mujib, who indicate that unless the Six-Point were included, he would return to Dacca the following morning instead of proceeding to Rawalpindi for the Round Table Conference. The Pathan and Baluchi leaders were prepared to support inclusion of the Six-Point demand and appreciated the Bengali support which was being extended to their demand for dissolution of one unit. There was intense discussion through the evening of March 8 with Air marshal Asghar khan, acting as a go between. Finally a compromise formula was evolved, under which the committee as a whole would present a minimum common charter of demands, leaving each party represent on committee free to press its own separate demands. Thus Sheikh Mujib and the Awami League would be able to present their demands before the Round Table Conference. It was on this basis that Sheikh Mujib agreed to attend the Round Table Conference.
Sheikh Mujib left for Rawalpindi on March 9by road, and after instructing us to prepare a comprehensive statement elaborating the demand for regional autonomy on the basis of Six-Point. Throughout the day, work continued on the draft, which was taken to Rawalpindi on the evening of March 9. in this statement Sheikh Mujib while supporting the common demand for establishment of a federal parliamentary democracy and direct election on the basis of the basis of universal adult franchise, put forward the demand for regional autonomy as defined in the six point formula. In this statement each of the six points were defined with precision and elaborated on the basis of basis of the formulations which had been made by the expert working group. Support was expressed for dismemberment of One Unit and it was urged that the representation in the federal legislature should be on the basis of population-one vote. As a demonstration of Awami League's intentions to engage in serious negotiations, Sheikh Mujib proposed that a committee of experts be set up, composed of experts be set up, composed of experts to be nominated by each side, to work out the implications of granting regional autonomy on the basis of the Six-Pointe formula. His team of experts was fully prepared to enter into such negotiation. In addition to the experts who had accompanied him, Dr. Nuzrul Islam, then Director of the Pakistan Institute of development Economics, had also been alerted and stood in readiness to join the team, should negotiations have to be conducted in a committee of express.
Upon arrival in Rawalpindi I found that Manzoor Quader was also in Rawalpindi. He contacted me and informed that he had been asked by Ayub to be available in Rawalpindi, as an adviser. When told about Sheikh Mujib's proposal and hopped that such a committee would be set up and in that event he expected to be on such a committee from the government side.
As events were to show, the Punjabi reaction was to close their ranks and to refuse even to discuss the Six-Point formula. It is known that the Punjabi opposition leaders were constantly in meeting with Ayub and his Law Minister Zafar. Indeed, even before Ayub himself raised objection to the Six-Point formula, Chaudhri Mahammad Ali, in his opening statement, stated that the Democratic Action committee’s demand for a federal parliamentary government did not envisage change in the parity basis of representation or dismemberment of one unit. He also contended that the Round Table Conference was not competent to go into this questions. .
Dr. Nurul Huda, then provincial Finance Minister, was member of Ayub's team. He, however, maintained contact with the Awami League advisers and provided some “inside reports" on what was going on in the Government camp. According to him, there was considerable division of opinion between the 'hawks', who did not wish to concede any-thing on the demand for autonomy or dismemberment of One Unit and opposed even the formation of a committee of experts, while the 'doves' favored the formation of a committee of experts to discuss regional autonomy. Zafar and Admiral A. R. Khan are named as the 'hawks', with Doha supporting them. It was reported that Manzoor Quader, however, was supporting the formation of a committee, as was Dr. Huda himself.
I was also maintaining contact with Manzoor Quader. When I met him on March 11, Manzoor Quader reported that he was supporting the formation of a committee of experts. He then mentioned that he had been examining the six-point formula and found difficulty with the point which called for two separate currencies. when told that in the statement presented at the conference, an alternative proposal for a single currency within a federal reserve system has been put forward, he expressed surprise, since in the transcript which he had received from the cabinet division this alternative proposal had not been mentioned. I informed him that Sheikh Mujib had made a written statement and copies had been distributed and therefore was no scope for was no scope for such a major error in the transcription. He expressed dismay, and requested that a copy of Sheikh Mujib's statement may be given to him. This was obtained and hundred over to him. The reports of March 11 were that, on balance the government side was said to be leaning in favour of serious discussion of the regional autonomy issue and the formation of a committee of experts. Ayub was expected to make his opening statement on March 12.
Nothing of substance happened on March 12, since that day was taken up by protracted altercations between admiral A.R. khan and air marshal Asghar khan.
In the evening of march 12 reports began to be circulate by Dr. Huda and others, that the hawks were beginning to gain the upper hand. Subsequently, it was confirmed that a meeting had been held on the night of March 12 at which the antiautonomy elements i.e Panjabi opposition leaders as well as the hawks on the government side had sat together and decided to resist any concessions being made on regional autonomy or dismemberment of one unit.
On March 13, Ayub, looking weary and exhausted, read out a statement which made it clear that he had been prevailed upon by the hawks. According to an official, who was involved with these negotiations, Ayub has little freedom for manoeuvre, as Yahya and the army had by then decided to take over and were directing the negotiations behind the scene. since the emergence of the Army as the real power had been recognized, Sheikh Mujib had a separate meeting on 12 March with Yahya's and impressed upon him the importance attached by Bengalis to regional autonomy on the basis of the six-point scheme. Yahya had maintained an accommodating posture, and insinuated that Ayub and Monem khan had in their view been wrong in replying with the language of weapons’ to the six-point demand, rather than in dealing with it politically. In retrospect one sees this meeting as part of the preparation by Yahya for his entry into the political arena. While he ostensibly expressed the hope that the negotiations in the Conference might succeed, he wanted them to fail, and exerted the army's pressure to ensure their failure. For such failure was a necessary condition for a take over by him.
Ayub proceeded to announce what was in effect a unilateral award. In a statement which contained echoes of the arguments of Chaudhri Muhammad Ali and the Punjabi leaders, he declined to respond to the demand of regional autonomy or dismemberment of one unit. He announced that he would initiate amendments to the 1962 Constitution to provide for a federal parliamentary form of government and direct elections on the basis of universal adult franchise. Ayub sought to justify has inability to deal with the question of regional autonomy and one unit on the ground that these were fundamental questions which could only be considered by elected representatives. Subsequent event were to prove that the position taken was purely tactical since when 21 months later a body of elected representatives was ultimately constituted, the same Punjabi leaders took up the position that these questions were too fundamental to be dealt with by that body and should be resolved outside in a round table conference. No sooner had Ayub read out his award, the Punjabi leaders, even without waiting for a show of consultation among members of the Democratic action Committee hastened to congratulate Ayub. Since it was then quite clear that the anti autonomy forces had succeeded in shutting the door to negotiations on regional autonomy, Sheikh Mujib rejected the award. On returning from the conference hall, Sheikh sat with his senior colleagues to decide on the line of action to be followed. A press conference was called for 3 p.m. I was asked to Prepare a statement for the press-the key points were to be rejection of the award. Withdrawal from DAC and for the movement to go on. The atmosphere was tense. while on the one hand, messages were being sent, one conveyed by Manzoor Quader to me that efforts wire still being made to see if negotiations could be resumed, the air was filled with rumours that the military was getting ready to take over.
At the press conference, Sheikh Mujib announced the withdrawal of the Awami League from DAC, and declared that the mass movement would go on. The democratic Action Committee was declared dissolved the same evening.
Sheikh Mujib called Dacca on the telephone as he was anxious to gauge the popular reaction, which he had correctly assessed would support his decision to reject Ayub’s award to carryon the movement. The public reaction of the Bengalis was electric: spontaneous demonstrations in Dacca denounced Ayub, the Punjabi leaders and those Bengali who had acquiesced in Ayub’s award, and pledge their support to the six-point movement. Sheikh Mujib's positions as the authentic spokesman for the Bengali people was confirmed by these demonstrations.
Ayub realized that the other Bengali leaders had little hold over the people or the situation in the Eastern win and therefore of the futility of doing business with them. He met Sheikh Mujib immediately after the breakdown of the conference and pleaded his inability to accept the six-point demands on the grounds that constitutional amendments to give effect of it would not muster enough support in National Assembly, Sheikh Mujib countered that, given the mood of the Bengalis could be expected to support them. Ayub then shifted ground and said that such amendments would take a great deal of time to work out. Sheikh Mujib assured him that draft amendments could be delivered within three weeks.
Sheikh Mujib, immediately on returning from that meeting, called his team of advisers and instructed them to produce these amendments as quickly as possible. On returning to Dacca, the working group labored night and day, to put together within three weeks, a set of amendments to the 1962 Constitution, which would give effect to the six point formula and dismember one-unit. It was decided that a Constitution amendment bill embodying these would be introduced in the National Assembly by toe Awami League members. Kamruzzaman carried copies with him to Rawalpindi, and an advance copy was delivered to Ayub on 22 March. Before these amendments could be considered by the National Assembly, Ayub’s response was to abdicate, giving as his reason his unwillingness to preside over the disintegration of the country. Yahya Khan, who had been preparing in the wings to relieve Ayub, stepped in the 1962 Constitution was abrogated, the National Assembly dissolved and Martial law was proclaimed.
Yahya had inherited the task of protecting the power structure which had been threatened by the mass upsurge. By the imposition of Martial Law, he had bought time. In his first speech he committed himself to transfer power to the elected representatives of the people. Shortly thereafter he began a round of bilateral consultations with political leaders. Sheikh Mujib proposed a constituent assembly consisting of elected representatives of the people, in which representation should be on the basis of Population, as the only proper way, and indeed the only method acceptable to the Bengalis, for framing a constitution.
Twenty two years had passed without the constituent unit of Pakistan having agreed upon the basis on which they were to live together. The British had transferred power to a sovereign constituent assembly. This assembly had been dissolved through the intervention of the Punjabi army in October 1954. The 1956 Constitution had been adopted in circumstances which raised questions about the representative character of the body which adopted it. There was also little doubt that one-unit and parity between east and west as well as the particular distribution of powers between the centre and the regions were in effect imposed upon that body by threats of martial law. The 1962 Constitution had been promulgated by a presidential proclamation. The demand for a properly elected Constituent Assembly constituted on the basis of population was one of the points in the 21-point election manifesto of the United Front which had swept the polls in East Bengal in 1954. Now this fundamental issue, namely that the basis for living together among the different constituent units of Pakistan should be determined by the elected representatives of the people, could no longer be eluded. The Punjabi army had no legitimate basis to rule Pakistan. Indeed, it is not without a touch of irony, that the Pakistan Supreme Court ruled sometime in 1972, after the holocaust in Bangladesh, that Yahya was a usurper and that his assumption of power had been unconstitutional.
The Punjabi leaders who had argued in Ayub’s Round Table conference that only elected representatives would be competent to decide on such fundamental questions as the content of regional autonomy now changed their tune. Some among them began to press for the restoration of the 1956 Constitution, with a few amendments which were to be negotiated in a conference of political leaders. Others pressed for a promulgated Constitution like the 1962 Constitution. The prospect of a Punjabi minority being outvoted in my national body of elected representatives the nightmare of the Punjabis since the day Pakistan came into being was deeply disturbing to them. The Pathans and Baluchis and large sections of Sindhis concentrated on pressing for the immediate dismemberment of one-unit.
Yahya perceived that naked military rule could not be continued indefinitely in the face of the roused populace. He had to find some basis to legitimize his rule and to contain the pressures in both wings. His real challenge lay in the east where a strident Bengali nationalism and united the entire people behind a single leader. It had been made clear by Sheikh Mujib that the 1956 Constitution would be totally unacceptable to the Bengali people, as would any Constitution, promulgated by a decree. The consent of the Bengali people could only be secured to a Constitution framed by a Constituent Assembly consisting of directly elected representatives of the people. The Punjabi elite when threatened by an elected majority had tended to rely upon the army to secure their interests. They clearly received the threat posed by a Constituent Assembly, which might enact a Constitution which would denude the Centre of those powers which the regarded as a vital importance to them, in particular control over economic resources. The military which had been accustomed to steadily increasing defence expenditures no doubt shared this anxiety.
Faced with this situation, Yahya appeared to make certain concessions. On 28 November 1969, he declared that he would promulgate a legal frame work for setting up a constituent assembly. He conceded the principle of one main, one vote, or representation on the basis of population. This was to give the Eastern wing 169 seats in an Assembly of 313. He also announced his decision to dismember one-unit. The concession on one-unit was obviously aimed at defusing the main divisive issue in the west, and thus pre empting the possibility of the anit—one—unit forces in Sind, NWFP and Baluchistan joining forces with the Bengalis in the assembly. The ground was thus cleared for representatives of the western wing to close ranks, unitedly to face the Bengalis. A calculated risk had, however, been taken, namely that of a united body to Bengali representatives passing a constitution which provided for regional autonomy on the basis of the six-point formula.
There is no doubt that this remained a source of major concern for Yahya. Some unusual provisions in legal framework order, which was promulgated on 28 March 1970, reflected these anxieties and bore witness to the reassertion of the role of the army as the custodian of the interests of the ruling minority. Article 20 of the legal framework order provided that the constitution shall be so framed as to embody five fundamental principles which were enumerated. The fourth principle was formulated thus:
All powers including legislative, administrative and financial shall be so distributed between the federal government and the provinces and the provinces shall have, maximum autonomy, that is to say maximum legislative, administrative and financial powers but the Federal Government shall also have adequate powers including legislative, administrative and financial powers to discharge its responsibilities in relation to external and internal affairs and preserve the independence and territorial integrity of the country.
Article 25 provided that the constitution Bill would have to be presented to the president for authentication. It was further provided that the assembly would stand dissolved if authentication were refused.
This provision was seen by the Bengalis as formally investing the Punjabi minority and the army with the power to veto decisions adopted by a majority in sovereing constituent assembly. Sheikh Mujib immediately declared that, while he welcomed the setting up of a constituent Assembly, consisting of representatives elected by the people on the basis of one man vote, in his view such a body would be sovereing and could not fettered in the exercise of its power to make a constitution by provisions such as Article 20 and 25. He called for the repeal of these provisions, and stated that in any event, such restrictions on people's sovereignty were illegitimate and invalid.
Yahya proceeded with preparations for holding elections. He had made certain careful calculations. As noted earlier, the decision to dismember one-unit was aimed to unite the representatives of the western wing in opposing the Bengali demand for autonomy on the basis of six-points. He had further provided that if the assembly could frame a constitution within 120 days it would be transformed into a national legislature for five years; if it failed within that time limit to frame a constitution, it would stand dissolved. This was expected to provide a strong incentive for members to arrive at a compromise —to compromise, it was hoped, on the demand for autonomy to the extent considered necessary by the ruling minority. If such a compromise were not arrived at, the president could refuse to authenticate. Apart from this, Yahya calculated that on party would get a clear majority in the eastern wing. In other words, that the Bengali majority would be fragmented, leaving him enough room to manipulate and manoeuver. This was a technique effectively used by the ruling minority in the fifties, and Yahya was encouraged to feel that this could serve him equally well. He was encouraged also b reports of the elderly Bengali politicians, like Hamidul Haq chowdhury, that Awami league would not win a strong majority.
As the pre-election campaign went on, it began to be increasingly calear that Awami league seemed to be emerging as a party with near universal support. Other parties began to sense that a groundswell was developing which was likely to give Awami league a sweeping majority. They, therefore, began to urge postponement of elections.
The occurrence of floods around august, provided an opportunity for leaders of different parties to press for postponement of the election date, which was October 5 1970. They felt that postponement of the elections might give them a chance to make up some ground. Their efforts to secure a postponement were successful. The date of the election was shifted from October 3 to December 7, 1970. The postponement, however acted in favor of the Awami league. The larger time enabled Sheikh Mujib to embark on a more extensive tour and personally to reach people in all parts of Bangladesh. Also, during this period, and event occurred which had a special impact upon the people and ultimately upon the election results, namely, the cyclone and tidal bore of November 1970, which swept the coastal areas of Bangladesh.
The magnitude of devastations and the death toll made it into a disaster which attracted headlines all over the world. The inaction displayed by Yahya and central Government was noticed both in the country and outside. Yahya stopped in Dacca on his return journey from China just after the cyclone, but did not stay back. Relief operations launched by the Government were slow and inadequate. This also provided Sheikh Mujib and Awami League with an opportunity to demonstrate both the capabilities in meeting such a situation and also to ventilate the sense of outrage felt by the Bengali people against the central Government.
Other parties again raised and chorus for postponement. The Awami League had voiced in the strongest possible terms, its opposition to such a postponement move. Indeed, Sheikh Mujib characterized such efforts at postponement as a conspiracy to obstruct transfer of power and warned that any such move would be resisted by the people. He stated that a million lives had already been lost and, if necessary, Bangalees would sacrifice a million more to frustrate the conspirators and to seize power, so that the people could be masters of their own destiny.
In the face of this situation, Yahya held back from further postponement. Only elections in the cyclone-affected areas (involving 17 seats) were postponed. Elections proceeded in accordance with the original schedule on December 7, 1970, in other places. Awami League won 167 out of 169 seats in the East in a house of 315. The overwhelmingly decisive election results, giving an absolute majority to Sheikh Mujib, was a clear verdict in favor of Sheikh Mujib, the Awami League and its sixpoint programme. This result clearly put Yahya's whole strategy in dire disarray. He had obviously banked upon fragmented representation in the east, so that he would be free to manipulate and man oeuvre. He was now confronted with an absolute majority. He thus found that the initiative had totally passed out of his hands and his power to manoeuvre was all but lost. He had counted on a fragmented representation from the east; indeed he was faced with a monolithic majority. That such were his calculations is not only an inference from circumstances but has been corroborated by West Pakistani leaders and by foreign leaders in whom Yahya confided.
In the elections in the west, Bhutto had emerged with 83 seats out of 131 with majorities only in the provinces of Sind and Punjab. Bhutto’s initial reaction to these results was revealing. His very first statement in the wake of elections was that no constitution could be made except with the agreement of the people's party. He asserted that Sind and Punjab were “bastions of power.” This was followed by the statement that “majority alone does not count in national politics". It was clear that he saw that the only way to contain the Bengali majority in the National Assembly was to confront it outside the Assembly. There he could supplement his strength from the one source upon which the ruling minority had always fallen back in order to deal with the Bengali majority, namely the army. It was the same pattern that had manifested itself throughout the 24 years of Pakistan. A minority unable to contain a majority within any democratically constituted representative institution had always fallen back upon military force. The Awami League had an absolute majority; they could not concede the veto which Bhutto claimed. Yahya at this stage maintained an apparently conciliatory posture. It would seem that towards late December, the position might have been that Yahya would make his own independent and preliminary attempt to negotiate with the Awami League to press for modification of the six-point formula, so as to secure the interest of the ruling elite and of the army. If he would succeed, then he together perhaps with other (West Pakistani politicians,) might close ranks and Bhutto might find himself totally isolated.
While Yahya might have harboured such thoughts, Bhutto, it appeared, was busy with a section of the Generals. According to a version published by one of Yahya's advisers, Bhutto had and important ally, General Peerzada, the principal staff officer of the president. It seems that Generally Gul Hassan and some others who survived the purge at end of 1971 after Bhutto took over were part of this group. Their attitude at the time was significantly summed up by a general who after a sumptuous dinner at Government House in Dacca is reported by another Pakistani army officer to have declared: Don’t worry...we will not allow these black backwards to rule over us.” Yahya come to Dacca in the middle of January. There was an initial meeting between Yahya and Sheikh Mujib at which meeting Yahya appeared to be maintaining an outwardly conciliatory posture but nonetheless sought clarifications about the six-point pragramme. This was obviously how he intended to open negotiations on the substance of six-points.
Yahya's adviser records that a detailed exercise had been done in Islamabad about the implication of six-points and indeed even a draft constitution had been prepared in December 1970. Therefore the request for explanation was, in fact, a polite invitation to negotiate on the substance of six-points. Sheikh Mujib and the Awami League were not prepared to enter into such negotiations. The elections had been declared a referendum on Six-Points by Mujib in June. The popular verdict was decisive. Sheikh Mujib had announced that “Six-Points' was now the property of the people and that he had no authority to compromise on the substance of ‘Six-Points’. This position had been declared in the mammoth public meeting held in early January, when all Awami league members elected to the national and provincial assemblies had taken oath not to compromise on the Six-Points. Yahya met Sheikh Mujib along with his senior colleagues Syed Nazrul Islam, Tajuddin Ahmed, Monsur Ali, Khandker Mushtaque Ahmed, and A H M Kamruzzaman. They proceeded to explain the Six-point programme. They sought assure Yahya that the Six-Points scheme was workable and that it would be worked out so that the limited powers and functions that were left with the centre could be discharged within the framework of constitutional provisions which would ensure the necessary resources to the centre for the purpose of its allocated functions. It was explained that constitutional provisions would ensure that foreign exchange and revenue recourse needed by the centre would be automatically received by the centre which would thus not be at the mercy of the regions.
After this meeting, I was asked by Sheikh Mujib to meet Peerzada separately to explain the Six-Point programme. At this meeting, it was obvious that the main anxieties were with regard to the foreign exchange and revenue resources for the centre. Anxiety was also expressed about the control of foreign trade and aid by the regions. It was explained that constitutional provisions could ensure that a portion of the Central Government. About foreign trade and aid, it was explained that negotiations on these matters would be considered by the regions, within the framework of the foreign policy of the country. It was also pointed out that conflict could not possibly take place since the Awami League would be in control of the Central Government as well as the government in the East. Peerzada maintained a non-committal position, but significantly he went on say that Yahya had also to carry (West Pakistan) with him and therefore it would be desirable for Awami League as well as people's Party would sail through the accelerate the transfer of power. Peerzada parting remarks indicated that Bhutto, Peerzada and at least a section of the army were in contact.
It is significant that straight from Dacca, Yahya flew straight to Larkana. Though it was described as a shooting trip, some of the Generals, a fair part of the ruling junta also flew into Larkana and an important meeting had taken place, confirmed by Bhutto in his Great Tragedy. There is little doubt that strategy was being evolved how to contain and frustrate the Bengali majority which had emerged in the elections. It was announced that Bhutto would be visiting Dacca shortly. Other West Pakistan leaders also being to come Dacca- Nawab Akbar khan Bughti, Maulana Noorani and Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan. Bhutto arrived in Dacca on 27 January. Several rounds of talks were held between Sheikh Mujib and Bhutto while separate parallel meeting were held between the Awami league team and the people's party team consisting of J Rahim, Sheikh Abdur Rashid, Ilanif Ramay, Abdul IIafeez Pirzada, and Rafi Raza. The Awami League team consisted of Syed Nazrul Islam, Tajuddin Ahmed Mansur Ali, Khandker Mushtaq Ahmed, A H M Kamruzzaman and myself. In the discussions between the teams, the Awami league members had thought that the discussions would focus on the substance of the six-point formula. The Awami league invited the people's party leaders to state their objections against six-points. They were assured that detailed explanations would be presented on each of the points with a view to remove any misgiving they might have about them. The people's party team however led by Rahim, instead of raising specific issues launched' into abstract discussions about the meaning of socialism. Rahim, launched into an exposition of the need for a strong centre in order to build socialism. In this context, he referred to the strong centre in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries as being essential for central planning. The Awami league members pointed out to him that such comparisons were not relevant. Instead they pressed him specifically to tarn to the six-point scheme. The recollection of this meeting is that there was a marked reluctance to engage in discussions on the specific issues raised by the six- point scheme. Nor was any alternative constitutional scheme presented. The discussions therefore were totally unstructured and there was no real communication. I chided Hafiz Peerzada that as a lawyer he should appreciate the need to be more precise in discussions. IIc was urged to persuaded his colleagues to proceed in discussions point and to specifically state their objections, so that specific replies could be given. He reacted by making a jocular remark that Rahim was an old man who had to be indulged and that they would be prepare for fuller discussion when they came to Dacca for a second round of talks in February. Bhutto's main concern, Sheikh Mujib, had requested to his colleagues as to whether he could be president, if h became prime minister; and what other posts could be secured by him and his parts if they were to form a coalition.
At the conclusion of the January talks, Bhutto addressed a press Conference in Dacca stating: “We have genuine difficulties and we need time at least up to the end of February to make a comment on it. “He also stated that “it was not necessary to enter into the Constituent assembly with an agreement on different issues because negotiations could continue event when the House was in session. “It was significant that when asked whether the Awami League with its present absolute majority in the house was competent to frame a constitution, Bhutto said; “Legally speaking they can but the question has to be decided by the House as to whether the Constitution will be adopted by a simple majority or by two-third majority. Since the question of making a constitution and our geographical position is peculiar, the majority adopting the constitution should include the consensus.
At the time of leave-taking, Bhutto's delegation members indicated that they would return for consultations with their party colleagues in the different provinces of West Pakistan and after such consultations they would return for further discussions with the Awami League in February, 1971.
The events of February 1971 and the postures which the people's party began to strike made it clear that they were not working towards resumption of dialogue but towards precipitating a crisis and ultimately, confrontation.
On 2nd February 1971, an interesting event took place. An Indian airlines Plane was hijacked to Lahore by two young men describing themselves as Kashmiri Freedom fighters. The reaction of Bhutto and his people's party to this event was to lionize these young men. Bhutto himself garlanded them and they were taken in a triumphal procession through the streets of Lahore. This also provides an occasion for a diatribe by Bhutto against India.
I clearly remember the reaction of Sheikh Mujib and the Awami League. The blowing up of the hijacked plane, even more than the hijacking itself, gave rise to suspicion. The suspicion was that clements interested in averting transfer of power to elected representatives were bent on creating abnormal conditions. A statement was issued by Sheikh Mujib deploring the blowing up of the plane stating:
Prompt and effective step by the authorities could have been taken to prevent its occurrence. It should have been realized that at this critical juncture in the nation's life, the creation of abnormal conditions can only serve the interest of sabotcurs. I would urge the Government to hold an enquiry into this matter and to take effective measures to prevent interested quarters from exploiting the situation for their nefarious ends.
For some weeks the two young “commandos” continued to be lionized. The people's party immediately mounted a campaign directed against Awami League for deploring the hijacking and the blowing up of the plane. The Awami League's office in Lahore was attacked. Indeed, it began to be said that the divergent reactions to the hijacking of the Awami League and the people's party showed up how difficult it might be to evolve a common foreign policy-this in context of the fact that forcign affairs under the six-point scheme was to be a Federal subject.
Reacting to the pressure that Awami league should make no specific comments on the hijacking, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman pointed out that this could hardly be expected when the government had not taken any steps to brief him on precisely what had happened, even though he was admittedly the leader of the majority party. An interesting foot note is provided by the fact that Alive, the additional foreign secretary appeared in Dacca on 1 march, 1971 and sought and appointment on 2 March 1971 to brief Sheikh Mujib about the hijacking incident. Since 2 March marked the beginning of 'Non cooperation Movement, Alive found that his mission had been overtaken by events.
An important consequence of the hijacking that India suspended all over flights over Indian Territory by Pakistani aircraft. This meant that the only route by which aircraft could come from the west to the west was all the way around over the southern tip of the Indian peninsula over Ceylon, thus almost trebling the distance and the travelling time. This also meant making a military solution in the cast very much more expensive and difficult, should the junta be disposed to opt for this.
The abortive talks with Bhutto and the delay in convening of the session of the national assembly had begun to feed the fear that Yahya and military junta might be seeking some pretext for not calling the national Assembly.
The suspension of the over fights did mean that troop movements, movements of arms and supplies to the military in the east would be impeded; thus affecting their capabilities.
It can now be recorded that the possibility of a declaration of independence was actively considered by Sheikh Mujib in a closed door meeting with main party leaders in early February 1971. The delay in the convening of the assembly inevitably lcd Awami league to consider its own options. A vanished declaration of independence was seen as an option. Careful calculations had to be made of the magnitude of the military response to such a declaration and the capacity of the people to withstand such an onslaught and to overcome it. Some calculations were made of existing military strength. The suspension of the over flight and the difficulty this created for augmenting men and material was also taken into account.
I was asked to draw up a draft declaration of independence. The text used as a precedent was the American declaration of independence which recited the injustices perpetrated by the British crown as justifying the act of declaring independence. a draft was duly prepared and handed to Sheikh Mujib around February, 10 which he then kept with him. Tajuddin had been associated in this drafting and he was also to outline the plan of action for implementing the decision to declare independence, should this course of action have to be adopted. The essentials of the plan, as discussed, were that massive popular demonstration would be launched in the main citics. Ilundreds of thousands of people would be out on the street. While this would sufficiently distract the military, the main targets would be the radio station, the secretariat and government's house, where the governor should be prevailed upon to make an announcement formally transferring power to the elected representatives.
In the meantime, Awami league kept pressing for convening the national assembly. In a joint meeting of all Awami league members elected to the national and provincial assemblies and members of its working committee was called on 13 February would be called upon to consider the option of declaring independence. I remember foreign diplomats asking him on the eve of this meeting are you going to declare UDI at this meeting?”
On the very morning when the joint meeting was to take place and the atmosphere was already one of rising anger at the delay in convening the national assembly. Yahya announced that the meeting of the national assembly would be held in Dacca on 3 March, 1971.
Bhutto's reaction to this announcement was to take a further step towards the crisis. In a statement in Peshawar on 15 February 1971, he expressed his party's inability to attend the national assembly session on 3 march in Dacca, in the absence of an understanding for compromise or adjustment on the six-point. He further went on to say that his party-men would be in jeopardy in going to west Pakistan, stating that he could not be “a party in a position of double hostage because of Indian hostility and non-acceptance of the six-point.” On 16 February in Karachi, Bhutto stated that his Party's decision not to attend the ensuing session of the National Assembly was unshakeable and irrevocable."
On 17 February, Bhutto stated in Karachi that “under present circumstances, it was pointless for the people's party to attend the ensuing National Assembly session."Bhutto said that his party had tried its best to work out some agreed settlement and understanding with Awami League but now “there is no room for further negotiations with the Awami League."Of the six-points of the Awami League, Bhutto stated that “the most difficult was the one pertaining to foreign trade and foreign aid."
Thus Bhutto's statement showed a clear hardening of his position and in contrast to the statement made by him at the end of January in Dacca, when he had stated that further negotiations would be conducted with Awami League and that such negotiations could be held even within the National Assembly. Instead, there was now a refusal to come to the National Assembly and an assertion that there was no room for further negotiations with the Awami League.
The apprehension of the Bengalis that the position of the military junta or at least a section of the junta, was hardening and that Bhutto may be linked with them, was reflected in a question put to Bhutto by the press which prompted Bhutto to deny that his party's decision not to attend the Assembly did not have any blessings from the present regime. He said that there was no question of any agreement “behind the scenes” between him and anybody clsc. That this apprehension, and the question put by the press, was well founded appears from a recent account from one of Yahya's advisers, who writes that by the middle of February:
Bhutto, by this time, knew his bargaining strength; powerful members of the junta were with him rather than with Yahya. As pointed out earlier. Yahya had a free hand in formulating a scheme for the transfer of power and holding elections, but the junta adopted a policy of 'wait and see'; if Yahya was successful in maintaining the unity of the country by whatever constitutional devices, well and good, but from late January when Yahya had his abortive talks with Mujib, the junta was not prepared to remain as a passive spectator of the political and constitutional issues. From January, the process of decision-making changed...it is my assumption that in February, like Ahsan, Yahya might also have been replaced by Hamid; he would not perhaps have been unhappy to go, but for some reasons the junta had to carry on with Yahya, so Yahya continued play his role on an untenable situation.
In the third week of February an atmosphere of crisis prevailed. Around 19 February, military movements were noticed in Dacca and a machine gun nest appeared in the mound in front of the National Assembly building in Dacca. This led Sheikh Mujibur gently to summon party leaders to a meeting to review this development. Some of the student leaders were also present at the meeting. I was present at this meeting, where reports were brought that a great deal of activity was noticed to the Cantonment and there was apprehension that some military action was in the offing. F'aced with this situation, it was apprehension that some military action was in the offing. Faced with this situation, it was felt that no one should stay in his house that night and in the event of a military operation being launched, everyone was to leave Dacca and to mobilize the people in the country side to resist. No military, however, took place, but tension continued to mount.
On 21 February (Shaheed Day), the atmosphere was tense and emotionally charged. There was once again the expectation that at the meeting at Shaheed Minar, Sheikh Mujib might declare Independence. At that meeting, however, Sheik Mujib' stated that the Bangalee people were united and determined and that if their demands were not conceded then they would shed blood to realize their aspirations.
In the meantime, various delegations representing other West Pakistani parties were arriving in Dacca for discussions. The position taken by the Awami League in these discussions was that while they were committed to making a constitution on the basis of Six-points, they would certainly discuss all aspects of the draft with other political parties and seek to dispel any misgivings that they might have about the impact of the Six-points scheme on the legitimate interests of the Punjab, Sind, NWFP and Baluchistan or the viability of the Federal Government. A major press statement was made by Sheikh Mujib on 24 February, in which the Awami League's position was clearly explained. It was believed that just about this time a crucial meeting of the junta was held. Yahya's adviser's report of this meeting is as follows:
After the fateful Larkana talks, the army junta met formally at Rawalpindi in mid February to discuss the political situation. It was at this meeting that the junta decided to challenge Mujib if he persisted in his uncompromising attitude, but significantly it ignored Bhutto's provocative specches. Bhutto was now regarded by the hawkish generals like Hamid, Omar and Gul Hasan, as well as by his trusted friend Peerzada, as the defender of the “national interest” of Pakistan, as interpreted by the ruling elite. It was at this meeting that the junta decided to dissolve the cabinet whose members had already expressed their desire to be relieved after the election. But at the cabinet meeting on December 8, 1970, Yahya decided to continue with it as some of its members were useful in acting as links with Mujib, while he needed the services of some others as long as constitutional dialogue persisted. But now Yahya's hold over the junta, which had never been absolute, was declining because of his failure to modify Mujib's policy. Both Ahsan and Yahya were discredited. Ahsan wanted to be relieved and the junta decided that he should be replaced by a hawk, Licutenant General Tikka Khan. The cabinet was also dissolved on l'ebruary 17, but within forty-eight hours Yahya invited some of its members, including myself, to continue as his advisers. Instead of a council minister he wanted to have a council of advisers. (But the Bengali members of the proposed council-with one exception-Ahsanul Huq, declined to continue any longer. Of the West Pakistan members of the cabinet, only Cornelius decided to stay).
While the Constitution Drafting committee was engaged in this task, a senior Bengali Government official brought a message that a decision had already been taken to postpone the National Assembly session. He advised that Sheikh Mujib should immediately see Governor Ahsan to remonstrate with him. Sheikh Mujib was informed of this and the same morning he met Ahsan who also appeared to be disturbed by this report. Sheikh Mujib informed Ahsan that such postponement would be seen by the Bengali people as a conspiracy to deprive them of their rights as a majority, and the situation would explode. Ahsan promised to convey this to Islamabad. Later he confirmed that he had conveyed this view but there was no change in the decision. Indeed, he said that he had on his own suggested that if there was to be a postponement, it should be for a specific number of days and not for an indefinite period. In a specch on 28 February, Sheikh Mujib said that if any individual member of the Assembly said any reasonable thing, it should be accepted. On that day, Bhutto, in a long statement stated that he had narrowed down his disagreement to foreign trade and foreign aid, and that he could not give in on foreign trade and aid. He concluded by saying that either the Assembly Session should be postponed or 120 day time limit for Constitution-making should be removed.
Yahya's adviser's account of the immediate background of the postponement shows Bhutto was by now, working jointly in tending with the military junta. His report states:
So Yahya continued to pay his role in an untenable situation. Following Bhutto's threat, the National Assembly, which had been scheduled to meet on March 3, was postponed indefinitely. Yahya's announcement on March 1 on the postponement of the Assembly could not have been more provocative or tragic. When I asked him about it on March 5, he looked vacant and helpless; I was convinced he had only been a signatory to it. Bhutto and Peerzada were reported to have drafted the statement. Yahya, unlike on previous occasions, did not broadcast it; it was only read out over the radio.
Before Yahya left Rawalpindi for Karachi to persuade Bhutto to go to Dacca so that the National Assembly might not be postponed, he had already sent Peerzada. Ahsan and Yakub on the same mission to persuade to Bhutto to attend the National Assembly. He gave a solemn promise that if Mujib were to "thrust a Six-point constitution” against the wishes of the West Pakistan members and if his constitutional draft would mean splitting the country, he would at once prorogue the assembly; however nothing could satisfy Bhutto. When it became evident that as a result of Bhutto's threat of boycotting the assembly, the majority of the West Pakistan Assembly members would not attend the session, Yahya decided to postpone the summoning of the assembly, but he wanted to issue a statement which should cause the least provocation possible in East Pakistan. Though I was no longer a member of his cabinet, Yahya asked me to prepare a statement in a conciliatory vein. I immediately began to draft the proposed statement, which ran as follows:
In view of the complete deadlock between the two principal parties representing East and West Pakistan respectively. I am constrained to postpone the meeting of the National Assembly on March 3, 1971.I would however wish to make it absolutely clear that the postponement will not exceed two or three weeks and during this short period. I shall make all endeavors to bring rapprochement between the elected representatives of the two regions of our country. As you will recall, I have often said in the past and I want to reaffirm that I have no desire to impose a constitution either on East or on West Pakistan against the wishes of the people. A true federal constitution, to which the political parties and my regime are all committed, cannot be framed without the consensus of various federating units. I shall be the happiest person when a consensus on a federal union is arrived at, and on my part I assure my nation that I shall spare no efforts to achieve this supreme goal.
I sincerely hope and appeal to my brethren in East Pakistan to appreciate the gravity of the situation and allow me this short period of two or three weeks to work for an agreed formula. Insha Allah (By the Grace of god) we shall overcome this difficulty. Let us remember Quaid-e-Azam's immortal saying “Pakistan has come to say: “let us all dedicate over selves to the fulfillment of the desire of the Father of the Nation.
I personally handed over the draft of the statement at Islamabad airport as Yahya was leaving for Karachi. He subsequently gave it to Peerzada, who, in alliance with Bhutto, torpedoed it, I still feel regret that I did not accompany Yahya to Karachi. My reluctance was due to the fact that I was no longer a member of the cabinet; I also expressed my inability to accept his offer of being an “adviser” By accompanying Yahya to Karachi, I would have caused unnecessary speculation about my links with Yahya. But I now realize that Yahya's great weakness was his fickle mindedness; he approved my draft but in my absence, when Bhutto and Peerzada presented another draft, Yahya, true to his weak personality, accepted the provocative one. Though I cannot provide documentary evidence of this, I heard from the personal staff of the president, including the Military secretary that Yahya was most reluctant to sign the statement prepared by Peerzada in collusion with Bhutto. But the pressures were strong and Yahya yielded.
Clear and unambiguous signals had been conveyed to Yahya through Governor Ahsan that postponement of the Assembly would lead to a political explosion in the East. Ahsan confirmed that he had been transmitting these signals. On the night of February 28, there were still indications that Yahya might arrive in Dacca on March 1.The usual procedures which preceded the arrival of the president in Dacca were under way. The plane from Karachi which arrived on March 1, however, did not carry Yahya. A government official who travelled on that the departure of that plane had been twice delayed in Karachi as it was expected that Yahya would avail of that flight. Ultimately he had decided to stay back. It was reported that there had been extensive discussions with Bhutto on that night.
The entire Constitution Drafting Committee of the Awami League were assembled in the party office to put the finishing touches on the draft constitution bill. The Committee was still working to a 1 March dateline, and had very nearly completed its work, when one of the party workers came in to report that an important Radio broadcast was to be made at 1 p.m. work stopped and Sheikh Mujib and other party leaders then joined members of the Constitution Drafting Committee. A radio set was brought in order to enable them to hear the broadcast.
At 1305 hours the voice of a radio announcer read out the text of a statement ascribed to Yahya. The operative statement was that it bad been decided to “postpone the summoning of the National assembly to a later date” It was thus an indefinite postponement. The reason given was that an accepted consensus on the main provisions of the future Constitution had not been arrived at between political leaders. He referred to a political confrontation between the leaders of East Pakistan keeping away from the Assembly...If he were to go ahead with the inaugural session on the 3rd March; the Assembly itself could have disintegrated. “It was further stated that “it was imperative to give more time to the political leaders to arrive at a reasonable understanding on the issue of Constitution making, a session of the Assembly would be called."
In other words, Yahya clearly signified that the ruling minority would have a veto on Constitution making and indeed unless there was a prior understanding with them, the Assembly would not be convened. The Bengalis, despite being a majority in the Assembly, thus were to be reduced to impotence.
The reaction of those listening to this broadcast was one of total outrage. There could be no greater affront to the Bengali people than was contained in that brief statement. Indeed, it was evident within minutes that the sense of outrage that was felt by everyone in the party office was widely shared by the people. Government offices; banks, Insurance and other commercial concerns, were also emptying out. A cricket match had been on in the stadium. The students were already out in the streets in spontaneous demonstrations.
Sheikh Mujib, on hearing the broadcast, directed that all parliamentary members of the Awami League should assemble at Hotel Purbani at 3 p.m. when he would address them on the future course of action.
There was no doubt that a decisive moment had been reached in our history. It was clear that the ruling minority was not prepared to submit to the Bengali majority and had thrown down a challenge. They had a mechanized army equipped with tanks and supported by an Air force. As against this, on the Bengali side, there was the near total unity of 75 million people, who reacted with a shared sense of outrage and a common determination not to submit. Yet they were unarmed and in any head on confrontation it was clearly perceived that a huge price in human life would be exacted.
It was clear that there was only one course for the Bengalis a reaction of defiance. Thus, the threat of confrontation was now imminent. It was not known whether the military onslaught might not begin that very day. By the time I reached the Purbani Hotel, militant processions were seen advancing towards Purbani Hotel from different directions. The militance of the procession was evident from the fact that almost everyone had a bamboo or a stick in his hand and slogans were for 'Independence.'
In the context the reaction of the people was not surprising. The high hopes aroused in them by the success of the mass upsurge of 1969 were dashed to the grounds, first by the failure of the Round Table Conference, and then, by the imposition of the second martial law. It was again with a great deal of hope and a measure of bitterness against the central authority for its unsympathetic handling of the situation following the cyclone that they went to the polls and recorded their verdict. The protracted negotiations since the results of the elections were announced left them with little faith either in the goodwill of the military government or of its power base in the Punjab. The announcement of the postponement of the National Assembly eroded their faith both in the constitutional process and in the unity of Pakistan. Their experience of 1969 had given them a self confidence and now they were determined to play a more active role in shaping the course of history. The goal thus set was independence and they demanded the politicians to lead them to this destination.
The Awami League Parliamentarians were already assembled by 3 p.m. Sheikh Mujib, flanked by party leaders, arrived at 3.20 p.m. The atmosphere was tense. Hundreds of international pressmen were gathered, outside. Sheikh Mujib declared only for the sake of the minority party's disagreement the democratic process of Constitution making has been obstructed and the National Assembly session has been postponed sine die. This is most unfortunate. As far as we are concerned, we are the representatives of the majority of the people and we can't allow it to go unchallenged.
He announced a Non Cooperation Movement. A programme of action was announced for the next six days. A total strike in Dacca on 2, March, a country wide strike on 3 March and a public meeting on 7 March, 1971.
The initial challenge to the postponement of the National Assembly was, thus, presented in the form of a Non Cooperation Movement. In essence, this meant that no Bengali should co-operate, in any way, with Yahya or the military. Sheikh Mujib's statement on 2 march, 1971 declared;” It is the sacred duty of each and every Bengali in every walk of life, including Government officials not to cooperate with antipeople forces and indeed to do everything in their power to foil the conspiracy against Bangladesh". It was also declared that “representatives- elected by the people are the only legitimate source of authority. All authorities are expected to take note of this fact."
The task of the coming days was to direct the Non-Cooperation Movement so that it could achieve its object of paralyzing the administration but at the same time ensure that essential services and the economic life of the Eastern wing was not disrupted.
It was decided that directives should be issued centrally. Mr. Tajuddin, Amirul Islam and myself were entrusted with the task of drafting directives and issuing them after having these approved by Sheikh Mujib and party leaders.
The first directive issued on 2 March, called for a province -wide hartal from 3 to 6 March, 1971 from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m. in all spheres, including Government offices. Secretariat, High Court and other Courts. Some Government and autonomous corporations, like Post Offices, Railways and other communication services, transport (private and public), mills, factories, industrial and commercial establishments and markets. Exemptions were extended only to ambulance, press cars, hospitals, medical shops, electricity and water supply. The offices, the Courts, the industries, totally came to a halt.
Each evening the military declared a curfew which was systematically defied. The army opened fire on some of the defying crowds and a number of casualties took place. It appears, however, that General Yakub, the military commander, was pressing for reinforcements, as in his view, the forces available to him were not adequate to suppress with a popular movement which had acquired massive proportions. It is said that it was this military judgment which had had him not to take the Non-Cooperation Movement head on, but to await arrival of reinforcements. In any event, he was replaced in the first week of March by Gen. Tikka Khan, who had acquired a reputation for carrying on a ruthless operation against civilians in Baluchistan.
At a meeting organized by students on 3 March, Sheikh Mujib demanded that the military should be pulled back to the barracks and power should be handed to the elected representatives of the people. If the people were denied self rule and suppressed by force, the people would not hesitate to sacrifice their lives. He also called for launching a no tax campaign.
The same evening there was a radio announcement from Islamabad proposing a sort of round table conference of political leaders to be convened by Yahya in Dacca on March 10. The junta had begun to sense the magnitude of the movement which was underway. The call of a round table conference seemed only a further provocation, since this would have to sit at a round table conference with other leaders whose claims and credentials to be there at all would be highly questionable. In the meantime, curfews and firing upon unarmed civilians continued.
I remember the pressure for an immediate rejection by Sheikh Mujib to this radio announcement. There were one or two voices suggesting that this proposal may not be rejected immediately but that the situation may be observed before a response is given. Some others suggested that at least the response may be deferred till the following day. Sheikh Mujib, however, reflecting the prevailing mood decided that an outright rejection should be announced immediately. I was asked to prepare a statement for immediate issuance and within minutes the invitation to a Conference was termed as 'a cruel joke and rejected. Attention, both inside and outside the country, was now riveted to the meeting fixed for March 7. Foreign commentators had begun to predict that UDI would take place on March 7.
In the meantime, the Non-Cooperation Movement surged ahead. In view of the continued total compliance with the directive to continue the general strike, it soon became evident that in order to sustain a protracted movement, it would be necessary to ensure that essential services were maintained and certain essential economic activities Were allowed to be continued, so that the people were saved from undergoing avoidable hardship. Since the Non- Cooperation Movement had started on 1 March. Many government and non-government employees had not been able to encash them. People from all walks of life came forward actively to support the Non-Cooperation Movement, pointing out the problems which were being thrown up, and suggesting ingenious solutions to them.
In order to meet problems as they arosc, further directives were issued on March 4. These directives had now to be in the form of positive instructions, that is, it not merely asking people to refrain from doing certain things but specifically directing them to do certain actions or carry out certain functions, in accordance with the guidelines issued by the Awami League. This was the first step towards the Awami League assuming the functions of a de-facto Government in the Eastern wing. Thus. on March 4, specific directives were issued that government offices, where employees had not as yet been paid their salaries, should function between 2-30 p.m. and 4.30 p.m. only for the purpose of disbursing salaries. It was also directed that banks should function within the hours of 2.30 p.m. to 4.30 p.m. for the purpose of cash transactions within Bangladesh only in respect of salary cheques not exceeding 1500 rupees.
Since it was apprehended that opening of banks may lead to flight of funds to the West, it was specifically directed that no remittance should be effected outside Bangladesh and the State Bank was directed to take necessary action in this connection. The time was deliberately specified to be from 2-30 p. m. to 4-30 p. m. rather than in the morning, so that it would be clear to all that the offices were not opening in the normal course, but specifically under the directives of, and in accordance with the instructions issued by the Awami League. Further exemptions were issued to cover the cars of doctors, press cars, also fire services and local and trunk telephones within Bangladesh. These directives were strictly complied with and offices and banks functioned between 2-30 p. m. and 4-30 p. m. for the purpose. Further directives were issued to allow food godowns to remain open beyond 4-30 p.m. if necessary to complete delivery.
Members of some Trade Unions reported that in some cases a cheque for a substantially larger amount than 1500 rupees was required to be drawn representing the total wage bill of the workers in an establishment, who were then paid in cash. In order to meet these cases, directives to the banks were modified further to provide that a cheque for an amount higher than 1500 rupees may be drawn provided that the wage register showing the total amount to be drawn was produced along with the cheque. Indeed, since this also created administrative difficulties, it was in turn provided that such a cheque for an amount higher than 1500 rupees may be paid if it was certified by the trade unions of the industrial establishments concerned.
On March 6, I was contacted by a group of Civil Servants, led by Sanaul Haque, saying that they had decided collectively to declare their support to Sheikh Mujib and would like to call on him to state that henceforward they would act upon the directives of the elected representatives. I arranged a meeting at which delegation of civil servants led by Sanaul Haque, formally declared their commitment to comply with the directives of The Awami League. Sheikh Mujib directed that they should liaise with me and that the three who had been entrusted with the task to preparing directives should meet daily with the civil servants. This became the nucleus of the administration which was to run affairs in the Eastern wing of the coming weeks.
On March 6, a meeting was called of the Working Committee members of the party at the residence of Sheikh Mujib to consider the position to be adopted at the public meeting on March 7. There were expectations inside the country that a declaration of Independence would be made on March 7. Indeed, the students and the younger elements strongly favored such a declaration. In fact by March 7, there was liule doubt among party members that Independence alone could be an acceptable to students, the younger elements and indeed large sections of politically conscious people. But the burden of responsibility still lay with Sheikh Mujib and the party in this matter. The full implications of making a declaration of Independence on March 7 had to be carefully weighed.
Unilateral Declaration of Independence would mean directly engaging the full force of the military. They would not only have found the pretext for using force but would hit out with everything they had in order to impose their will by force. Could an unarmed population absorb the shock of such an onslaught and emerge victorious? What would be the reaction of the outside world? Would Governments come forward to recognize independent Bangladesh? Would an independent Bangladesh Governments be able to hold out for long enough in the face of an organized military onslaught to obtain such recognition? Apart from that, given the different global and regional interests of the powers, would they accord recognition and accept the emergence of an independent Bangladesh? These were among the many questions to which anxious consideration was given. In the meeting Sheikh Mujib heard different opinions which were expressed by different members and reserved judgment. The whole range of views was expressed, while the meeting was in progress. Yahya came on the air and broadcast a statement. It was a particularly provocative statement and highly offensive to Bengali sentiment. It blamed Sheikh Mujib and the Awami League for the prevailing situation. There was a menacing undertone from the statement.
While realizing that an application of adequate force can effectively bring the situation under control, I have deliberately ordered the authorities in East Pakistan to use the absolute minimum force required to stop the law breakers from loot arson and murder....
“Finally let me make it absolutely clear that no matter what happens, as long as I am in command of the Pakistani Army faces, I will ensure complete and absolute integrity of Pakistan. Let there be no doubt or mistake on this point. I have a duty towards millions of people of East and West Pakistan to preserve this country. They expect this from me and I shall not fail them. I will not allow a handful of people destroy the homeland of millions of innocent Pakistanis. It is the duty of the Pakistan army forces to ensure this integrity, solidarity and security of Pakistan, a duty in which they have never failed.
Translated into less pompous language, the message was that Yahya believed that there was a military solution possible of the situation, and that he regarded himself as possessing both the authority and the capability to adopt any measure and to resort to any degree of force he considered necessary for the purpose of “protecting the integrity of Pakistan."
The treat contained in this message was clear. On the conclusion of this broadcast Sheikh Mujib directed that the meeting of the working committee members may be adjourned till late that evening and that in the meantime, he would decide on the line to be adopted the following day.
The burden of a decision rested squarely upon him. Sheikh Mujib asked the senior party leaders, M/s Tajuddin Ahmed, Syed, Nazrul Islam, Khondaker Mushtaq Ahmed, Capt. Mansoor Ali. A H M, Kamruzzaman, for consultations. I was also called to join them. The implications of making an explicit declaration of Independence were carefully weighed. The fact that such a declaration would provide the army the opportunity they were seeking for a military onslaught was clearly perceived. It was decided that such an opportunity should be denied to them. At the same time, the momentum of the movement must be maintained and pressure should be kept on Yahya to proceed to transfer power to the elected representatives of the people. It was calculated that if the tempo of the movement could be sustained and the unity of the people consolidated then it would become evident to Yahya and the military junta that use of military force could not result in their gaining any objective. It was therefore decided that the position to be taken should not be an explicit declaration of independence. In order to exert pressure on Yahya specific demands would be made, and the movement would be sustained in support of these demands, with 'Independence “as its ultimate goal. These demands would include withdrawal of army to the barracks, stopping further movement of troops from West to the Eastern wing and an enquiry into the killings. Sheikh Mujib directed that the two major demands should be highlighted, namely the immediate withdrawal of martial Law and immediate transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people.
I was asked to prepare the draft of a formal statement embodying this position, which would be released to the press after the public meeting of March 7. In view of the importance of the pronouncement it was decided that a written text should be kept ready to be released to the Press after Sheikh Mujib delivered his speech on March 7. A draft text was prepared by the same evening. The draft presented had included the point about termination of Martial Law and transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people and the last paragraph was as follows:
The objective of the present phase of the struggle is the immediate termination of Martial Law and the transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people. Till this objective is attained, our non-violent Non-Cooperation Movement must continue.
Sheikh Mujib directed that the text should be kept under the charge of Tajuddin and should be personally issued by him after making any amendments as may be necessary in the light of the speech as actually delivered. The historic speech of March 7 lasted only 19 minutes. The operative sentence in that was;” Our struggle now is for independence, our struggle now is for freedom. “Also the immediate termination of martial law and transfer of power to the elected representatives were put forward as specific demand. The written text which was released was accordingly amended by Tajuddin to include these two points as specific demands. Thus, although independence was clearly set as the goal, Sheikh Mujib' stopped just short of a formal declaration since it was clear that the army had been mobilized and had conspicuously taken up positions at different vantage points in the city in order immediately to strike, should such a Declaration of independence be made. It may be mentioned that late the previous night (March 6) a Brigadier had called with a message from Yahya Khan, saying that he expected to come to Dacca soon and would hope to arrive at a settlement which would satisfy the Bengalis. This was a curious communication and was seen as trying to influence the position to be taken by Sheikh Mujib at the March 7 meeting. I was also seen as an attempt to create an alibi for himself; thus, if a declaration of independence were made, Yahya could turn round to the world and say that he had offered to go to Dacca and reach a peaceful settlement but it was Sheikh Mujib who had declared UDI and precipitated the use of force. This was another consideration in Sheikh Mujib's holding back from a formal declaration on March 7.
A further programme of action for the following week was announced. The “no-tax campaign was to continue. Further exemptions and specific directives were announced on March 7, and March 9, to allow essential economic activities to continue. It was directed that railways and ports may function, but railway workers and port workers were directed not to co-operate if railways or ports were used to mobilize forces for the purpose of coordinating repression against the people. The March 8 directives contained a number of specific directives to banks. These followed a round of meetings with Bengali bankers who reported numerous genuine difficulties which were being faced by parties. These new directives authorized banking transactions for purchase of industrial raw materials for running mills and also bonafide personal drawings of up to rupees 1000.00 In order to ensure that certain “essential” economic activities were maintained it was directed that relevant Government offices should remain open for purposes of supply of fertilizer and diesel to power pumps. It also directed that food supplies, supply of coal to brick fields and distribution of jute and rice seeds should be maintained.
A further meeting with bankers and with A K N Ahmed, a senior Bengali state Bank official, who came from Karachi, was held in order to work out a series of directives.....
Yahya arrived in Dacca on March 15. Sheikh Mujib met him on the morning of March 16. The meeting lasted for about an hour. When Sheikh returned. he called the senior leaders. I was also called in. Indeed for the coming weeks this was the procedure where after every meeting with Yahya or his advisers, a meeting was held to review the discussions. Sheikh Mujib reported that Yahya had begun by offering explanations for his action in postponing the National Assembly. Sheikh Mujib had charged him with a serious lapse in failing to consult Sheikh Mujib, who was the leader of the majority party before taking such a decision. Yahya then stated then stated that he would like to find a way out of the present situation. Whereupon Sheikh had told him that in view of all that happened and the mood of the people, nothing short of acceptance of the demands raised by him on March 7, in particular immediate withdrawal of Martial Law, and transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people, would suffice. Yahya then said that he had been advised that there were legal difficulties in withdrawing martial law before constitution was framed. Sheikh Mujib thereupon had said that he would ask his legal experts to meet Yahya's advisers to discuss this matter and convince them that no legal difficulty would arise.
Following this, Sheikh directed that I should meet Lt. Gen. Peerzada the same evening, to discuss this point about the supposed legal difficulty. I met Peerzada that evening, and availed of the opportunity to charge Pecrzada that they had been guilty of gross impropriety in postponing the Assembly in the way in which it had been done and told him that this had been taken as an affront to the entire Bengali people. He appeared uncomfortable and defensive. He then came to the question of the demands for immediate withdrawal of Martial Law and transfer of power to the elected representative. He argued that if Martial Law were withdrawn before any Constitution was framed, then there would be legal vacuum. I immediately countered this argument by saying that during the interim period between the withdrawal of Martial Law and the adoption of a Constitution, an Interim Arrangement's Order (in effect a provisional Constitution) could be in force and this could be promulgated by President/Chief Martial Law Administrator, by the same Order, which he revoked Martial Law. This argument was to feature prominently in the ensuing negotiations.
On the following morning, March 17, Sheikh Mujib met Yahya and reiterated his demand for withdrawal of Martial Law and transfer of power to elected representatives. Yahya again mentioned legal difficulties and stated that he has sent for Justice Cornelius, now his legal adviser, to consider these questions. A meeting between Yahya's advisers and the Awami League team was proposed. On the evening of 17 March, Syed Nazrul Islam, Tajuddin Ahmed and myself were deputed to sit in negotiations with Yahya's advisers namely, Peerzada, Cornelius and Col. Hassan (the Judge Advocate General). The meeting commenced with Peerzada observing that the discussions between Sheikh Mujib and Yahya that morning had proceeded on the basis that Yahya would make a Proclamation. He indicated certain basic elements which were to go into such a Proclamation had emerged from these discussions. According to him, Sheikh Mujib bad Proposed that a Constitution for the Eastern Wing should be drawn up by the Members from the Eastern wing separately and Constitution for Western Wing may be drawn up by the Members from the Eastern Wing separately and a Constitution for the Western Wing may be drawn up by the Members from the West and thereafter they should sit together to make a Constitution for Pakistan. It was also indicated that provision should be made for the East wing to enjoy autonomy on the basis of Six-Points. In the West the Provinces would enjoy autonomy to the extent enjoyed by a Province under the 1962 Constitution, the additional powers to remain with the Centre. Cornelius suggested that such an Instrument-a Provisional Constitution-should be brought into force by a Resolution of the National Assembly. It was then suggested that it would be best before the drafting of the Instrument was taken in hand, for the advisers both sides to sit in a plenary meeting with Sheikh Mujib and Yahya so that basic guidelines could be obtained from them.
It is not correct as stated in the Pakistan Government White Paper that on March 17, a martial Law Regulation had already been drafted providing for setting up of Council of Ministers to aid and advise the Governors of the Provinces or that such a regulation had provided for the Martial Law to recede into the background. The discussion, in fact, were exploratory and most of the time was spent in going over the ground relating to the question of legal vacuum which according to Cornelius and Peerzada would occur if Martial Law were to be revoked before a Constitution was adopted. The counter-argument was put that an Interim Arrangements Order could be brought into force by a Proclamation, which would provide the bridge between the withdrawals the withdrawal of Martial Law and the adoption of a Constitution.
It is now on record that following the meeting of March 17 Yahya khan asked General Tikka khan to “get ready” and, accordingly, on the morning of March 18, Major-Generals Khadim Husain Raja and Rao Farman Ali prepared the blueprint for Operation Searchlight-the codename given to the plan for a military crackdown all over the province to be effective on March 25.
On the morning of 19 March, Sheikh Mujib had another meeting with Yahya and emphasized that that the only solution was for withdrawal of Martial Law and transfer of power to the elected representatives. An Interim Arrangements Order could be in force during the interim period. Such an Order could be made by a Presidential Proclamation. The same evening Yahya's Advisers sat with the Awami League team.
It is not correct as the Pakistan Government While paper states, that the President's team had provided a Martial Law regulation to meet the demands of the Awami League “as far as was legally possible."
There was no indication of the existence of many such Martial Law Regulation having been drafted. Indeed, the following morning a good deal of time was taken up over the argument as to the legal vacuum and it was only, thereafter, that the question of drafting of any Instrument at all came up in the discussion.
On the morning of 20 March, Sheikh Mujib met Yahya. On this occasion Sheikh Mujib took with him Syed Nazrul Islam, Tajuddin Ahmed, Capt. Mansoor Ali, Khandaker Mushtaq Ahmed, A H M Kamruzzaman and myself. On Yahya's side, Peerzada, Cornelius and Col. Hassan were present.
On the previous day, while army trucks had been passing through Tongi, they had been attacked by the people, and an exchange of fire between the army and the people had taken place. Indeed, it was one of the first instances of the people having offered armed resistance to the military. The White Paper also reposts that people had obstructed what the White Paper calls the normal movement of army supplies by Pakistani Ship M.V. Swat, when to the Bangalees these 'supplies' represented arms intended to massacre the people. The atmosphere was tense. In some excitement, Yahya said, although he had come to negotiate and that he had the army to exercise restraint, he could not tolerate movement of military supplics' being obstructed by the Awami League. Sheikh Mujib also reacted strongly, saying that while negotiations were going on, it was expected that the army should remain in the barracks. Yahya countered by saying that even if they stayed in barracks, the movement of army supplies must continue. Sheikh Mujib then stated that the movement of such army personnel in trucks was a provocation to the people since earlier there had been so many incidents where innocent unarmed civilians had been fired upon by military personnel. Indeed, very near Jaydevpur where the latest encounter had taken place only a few days earlier, innocent young unarmed persons had been fired upon by army personnel killing some of them, so that the emotions of the local people had been aroused. Sheikh Mujib urged that, given the roused feelings of the people, the army should not offer provocations. He also said that you know if unarmed people kept being shot at, ultimately they may also be forced to take up arms to shoot back, therefore, it was desirable that there should be a political solution and no further blood-shed.
This strong statement by Sheikh Mujib seems to have had some effect on Yahya, who then reverted to the question of a political solution, by saying that he was a simple man and although he was ready in principle to accept Sheikh Mujib's demands, he had been told by this experts that the withdrawal of Martial Law before a Constitution came into force would create a legal vacuum. Cornelius picked up this point and read a short lecture on Constitutional Law and the need for there to be an ultimate source of authority in any legal system. I immediately countered by saying that there need be no such vacuum an Instrument was promulgated by Yahya in the form of an Interim Arrangements Order which would be valid and remain in force till such time as the Constitution was adopted. Since arguments on this point tended to go on, I thought there might be a way out by suggesting that this point could be examined by a Constitutional cxpcrt, such as A K Brohi, whose views would be adopted by them.I knew that Brohi was in Dacca and was confident that his opinion would support the Awami Langue position, since it was legally sound. I also knew that Cornelius specially respected Brohi and was therefore likely to accept this suggestion. My assessment proved to be right, for Cornelius reacted by saying that such an opinion would be helpful. I undertook to obtain and forward such an opinion. Sheikh Mujib turned to Yahya and said that it was for experts to find a way to give effect to the political decision which they would arrive at “If we agree to give the necessary directions it will be the duty of experts to them” he asserted.
It was then proposed that the basic points which were to be incorporated in the proposed document to be drawn up should be noted down. These were to be worked out in the draft proclamation:
a) Withdrawal of Martial law
b) Transfer of power to elected representatives
c) Enjoyment of greater autonomy by Eastern wing (It was emphasized that this must be on the basis of the Six-Point scheme)
It was agreed that the President's Advisers would sit with the Awami League team the same evening to discuss how to give effect to this decision.
Yahya then raised the point that he thought that it would be necessary for him to consult West Pakistan leaders. Sheikh Mujib said that this was a matter for him to consult West Pakistan leaders. Sheik Mujib' said that this was a matter for him and he was free to proceed as he wished. Yahya said that he considered if essential for him to seek concurrence of the West Pakistani political leaders as otherwise the responsibility would be too much for him. He also said that he wanted a signed letter from all the political leaders requesting him to make a Proclamation.
Yahya then said that he proposed to invite the West Pakistani Leaders, and in particular Bhutto. Sheikh Mujib' said that the President was free to do so and that was a matter for him to decide. Sheik Mujib, however, said that he would not directly meet Bhutto but that Yahya could meet him separately. This was in part an expression of resentment at the way in which Bhutto and his party had conducted themselves during and after the discussions held barely six weeks earlier. A more important reason was that Bhutto and Yahya were seen as basically representing the same interests, and, therefore, to allow them to negotiate separately would result in conceding to them a significant negotiating advantage.
I suggested that a working draft should be prepared by the government said, since they could draw upon the resources of the Law Ministry. It was suggested that the Legal Draftsmen of the Ministry of Law be sent for. A copy of the draft was to be sent to the Awami League team as soon as it was ready.
On the morning of 21 March I was sent for by Sheikh Mujib. He and Tajuddin were in the midst of a discussion and he put to me a view that he had been giving thought to the matter of transfer of power and he thought that it would be expedient to Press for immediate transfer of Power only in the provinces and that, given the mood of the Bangalee people, it would not be advisable for Awami League to be seen to take over power at the Centre. It seems there were several reasons which weighed with him in coming to this conclusion.
(1) The mood particularly among the students was that the people's movement should not be compromised and that Awami League should not for the sake of `power' compromise on its demands. Taking power at Center could well be projected as such a compromise. Indeed some of the student leaders, who had met Sheikh Mujib earlier, made this point forcefully.
(2) Taking Power at the Center in the absence of a Constitution would expose Awaim League to the risk of being ineffective at the Centre and thus discrediting themselves even before the Constitution could be framed.
(3) Taking power in the Province only would be a formula whereby the Awami League could consolidate its Position in the East without assuming responsibility for the center, which responsibility it would find difficult to discharge having regard to the preponderance of the Punjabi bureaucracy and army.
(4) This would also enable Awami League an opportunity to muster the resources of the provincial Government, and in particular the police and EPR, to face a situation of armed confrontation, the possibility of which had begun to loom large.
It appeared that Yahya might himself go along with this formula, since he could thereby retain his position at the Center. Accordingly, Sheik Mujib and Tajuddin sought an immediate meeting with Yahya. They told Yahya that in the present circumstances provision should only be made for transfer of power in the provinces.
In the meantime, an exhaustive written opinion was formulated and signed by Brohi. This was delivered to Col. Hassan. The Pakistan Government White Paper is therefore guilty of blatant falsehood in asserting that Awami League failed to produce a Constitutional Expert to support point regarding the legal validity of the draft Proclamation.
On 21 March a draft Presidential Proclamation said to be prepared by Col. Ilassn was ready and a person was sent to collect it. This draft was examined by the Awami League team. It had obviously been prepared hurriedly. Interestingly enough, it had provided for Members from the Eastern wing to sit as a separate committee to frame provided for Members provisions relating to that wing and similarly for Members from the Western wing to sit as a separate committcc. It provided that the proclamation of Martial Law would stand revoked from the day on which Ministers of the provincial governments took oath. Upon scrutiny of this draft, the Awami League team found that the draft was incomplete in many respects and imprecise in a number of formulations. First of all, it was their view that the revocation should be more prompt and should not be a long-drawn out process taking effect on the taking of oath by Provincial Ministers, a process which could be protracted, given the fact that five provinces would be involved. It was felt that the proclamation should take effect more promptly. The Awami League team suggested a formula whereby the proclamation would take effect on appointment of Provincial Governors or on expiry of 7 days from promulgation, whichever was carlier.
Bhutto, in the meantime, had arrived on the afternoon of 21 March. I remember when the revised draft was presented; Cornelius had been moved to say that this was indeed an improved and more complete draft. I immediately stated that this should not be described as the Awami League draft. The entire task of drafting should be regarded as a joint exercise. A clausc by clause reading of the amended draft proclamation then began. Peerzada mentioned that he would be meeting Bhutto's advisers and had earlier indicated that a copy of the revised draft had been sent to Bhutto.
In Bhutto's own language the position on his arrival was as follows:
At 7.30 that evening I met President Yahya Khan, at President House. The President informed me of the series of meeting he had held with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had addressed a press Conference on the 18 in which he said that progress had been achieved. As a result, the experts of the Awami League and of the President also held discussions on the proposed Constitutional arrangements. The President proceeded to inform me about the proposal made by the Awami League leader.
The salient features of the proposal were that Martial Law be withdrawn immediately and power transferred in the five provinces without affecting a similar transfer in the Central Government. According to this proposal the President would continue running the Central Government as was being done at the time or, if he so chose with
the assistance of advisers not drawn from the peoples' representatives. It was also proposed that the National Assembly be divided ab initio into two committees, one for West Pakistan comprised of the elected representatives from West Pakistan and the other for Bangladesh in Dacca. The committee would prepare their separate reports with a stipulated period and submit their proposals to the National Assembly. It would then be that task of the National Assembly to discuss and debate the proposal of both the committees and find out ways and means of living together. Under an interim arrangement, which was to be amended form of the 1962 Constitution, East Pakistan would be given autonomy on the basis of Six Points and the Provinces of the West wing would have powers as provided in the 1962 Constitution, but would be free to work out their quantum of autonomy according to a mutually acceptable procedure, subject to the President's approval. The entire scheme was to be published in the form of a Presidential Proclamation.
Bhutto then goes on to state that:
After narrating the proposal. Yahya told me (Bhutto) that he had made it clear to Sheikh Mujib that Yahya's concurrence to the proposal would be subject Primarily to Bhutto's agreement, but that he (Yahya) would be more satisfied if other leaders of West Pakistan would give their consent.
On the morning of 22 March, Sheikh Mujib called on Yahya to resume discussions while the written text of the draft proclamation was under discussion between the two teams. The white Paper's account that the President prevailed upon Bhutto himself to meet Sheikh Mujib is not true. Indeed, Sheikh Mujib, when he had gone for a meeting with Yahya, found Bhutto present and took the opportunity to draw him aside to have a few words with him. According to Sheikh Mujib he suggested to Bhutto that it would be better for them to talk outside in the verandah so that they may not be overheard. Bhutto's own account of this meeting is the following words:
On the morning of the 22nd I arrived at President House a few minutes before the appointed time. Mujibur Rahman arrived promptly at 11 O'clock. We greeted each other and exchanged a few formal words.
After that we were escorted to the President. Once again there were formal greeting....
Mujibur Rahman then turned the President and asked him if he had given his final approval to the proposals of the Awami League. The President reminded him that it was necessary for me also to agree and for that reason I was present at the discussions. On that Mujibur Rahman remarked that the proposals had been communicated to the President and it was for the President to convince me, and went on to say that once Mr. Bhutto agreed in principle to the proposals, they could hold formal discussion, but until then the discussions were of an informal nature and on leaving the President he would tell he had met the President and that Mr. Bhutto also happened to be present The President replied that this was not good enough, but Mujibur Rahman remained adamant.....
As we entered the Military Secretary's room on our way out, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman asked General Mohammed Umar, General Ishaque the Military Secretary to the President and the President's Naval aide-de-camp who were sitting in the room, to leave as he wanted o talk to me. I was a little surprised by this sudden change of attitude on his part. He grasped me by the hand and made me sit next to him. He told me that the situation was very grave and that he needed my help to overcome it. At this point, thinking the room might be bulged, we walked out to the verandha towards the back of the house and sat in the portico behind the President's salon.
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman repeated that he told me in the Military Secretary's room, and went on to say that things had now gone too far and there was no turning back. According to him the best way out was for me to agree to his proposals. He emphasized that there was no other a alternative. Ile told me that he now realized that the People's Party was the only force in West Pakistan and the ether politicians Of West Pakistan were wasting his time .lle volunteered the information that he had rebuked all of them except Khan Abdul Wail Khan, whose party at least represented one province, when they called on him. He said that he was now convinced that it was essential for the two of us to agree .He told me I could do whatever I wanted in West Pakistan, and he would support me. In retur I should leave East Pakistan alone, and assist him in ensuring that the Awami League's proposal materialized. He suggested that I should become the Prime Minister of West Pakistan and he would look after East Pakistan. According to him this was the only of the impasse. He cautioned me against the military and told me not to trust them: if they destroy him first, they would also destroy me. I replied that I would much rather be destroyed by the military than by history. Ile pressed me to give my consent to his proposal and to agree to the setting up ab initio of the two committee....
I told him that I would naturally give my most careful thought to his proposal and do everything possible o arrive at fair settlement. However, whatever the inal shape of the proposal, it should be passed by the National Assembly, if necessary in the form of a resolution authorizing the issuing of the Presidential Proclamation. I further informed him that I was not prepared to give any letter in connection with p proposals made outside the Assembly......
Mujibur Rahma rejected the idea of the Assembly meeting at all, even briefly. Whatever the nature of the arrangement he was now determined to have it concluded in full without the National Assembly sitting as an Assembly for the whole country. After expressing those views he got up to leave. I accompanied him to his car and we said goodbye to each other. This was my last meeting with the Awami League leader.
Bhutto's account confirms the basic position that was being maintained by Sheikh Mujib. The point, however, that is made about Bhutto's own insistence that the National Assembly must first mcct and approve the inter-arrangements though subsequently asserted, had not at this stage been present. For after this encounter between Sheikh Mujib and Bhutto, the impression conveyed both inside and outside was that there was the glimmering of a possibility of political settlement. Indeed, Sheikh Mujib reporting to the Awami League team this encounter, said he felt that Yahya and Bhutto may have realized that it was in their best interest to have a solution along with the lines that had been proposed. Their position at least in the Western wing was thus safeguarded. Yahya would remain president, Bhutto would get power in Punjab and Sind and since the Constitution for the Western wing would be made by a committee consisting of members from the west, Bhutto's party would in effect dominate that committee. I remember some foreign correspondents also saying that the two committees' approach may just be what Yahya and Bhutto wanted in order to secure their position in the west. The 22nd was a day of optimism the hint of a possibility of a settlement appeared to be in sight.
In the evening of 22 March, the Awami League team went through the draft proclamation in my office, where Sheikh Mujib and other party leaders came and a careful reading was given to the entire draft since it seemed that such a draft may ultimately become a proclamation. Throughout the night of 22March work went on to prepare a finished draft.
March 23 was an extraordinary day. This had previously been celebrated as 'Pakistan Day'. This was the day, however when thousands of Bangladesh flag were on sale. I remember as I drove out of my office at 6 a. m in the morning, with copies of the revised draft, I bought a Bangladesh flag at the Nawabpur railway crossing. I arrived at Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's house at about 7 I the morning with the revised draft. Soon many processions came there and hoisting of a Bangladesh flag in his house took place. Indeed, most of the houses and cars bore Bangladesh flags.
The Awami League team drove into president's house at 11-30 that morning with a Bangladesh flag on their car. The hostile reaction of military officers at president's House when they saw the flag was all too visible.
When the Awami League team entered, they were told that M.M. Ahmed and some other financial experts had been brought over by the Government to examine the implications of the financial and economic provisions. Indeed, M. M. Ahmed started by saying that he thought that the Six Point scheme could be given effect to with some minor practical adaptations. Peerzada proposed that M. M. Ahmed may sit with the Awami Langue financial experts and mentioned the name of Nurul Islam. Indeed the Awami League financial experts. Nurul Islam, Anis Rahman, Rehma Sobhan and others had been meeting daily at Nurul Islam's house and in fact, the financial and economic provisions in the Awami League revised draft had been voted by them. The Awami League team did not, however, wish to accept this proposal for a separate meeting between financial experts as it was seen as a time-killing man oeuvre. The Awami league team had begun to sense that Yahyas advisers were trying to prolong discussions on each cause and this was clearly see as a dilatory tactic. In the evening sitting of 23 March M M Ahmed produced a number of written slips by way of amendments and insertions to draft. Even in respect of foreign trade and aid, M. M. Ahmed showed some flexibility. He said foreign trade could be left with the Eastern wing without any difficulty. About aid, he said the difficulty could be over come if foreign policy aspects were left with the Centre. About the reconstruction of the State Bank he said this also could be done and that in the interim period the Dacca branch of the State Bank could function as the Reserve Bank of Bangladesh. There could also be a bifurcation of the বাংলাদেশের স্বাধীনতা যুদ্ধ দলিলপত্রঃ পঞ্চদশ খণ্ড foreign exchange account the earnings generated by exports from the Eastern wing could be maintained in account with the Dacca branch. Bifurcation of taxi collection presented a more complex problem, and it was agreed that the Awami League team would present a practical scheme to deal with this matter in interim phase.
The Awami League team itself to join their economic experts who had been meeting continuously at Professor Nurul Islam's residence. The amendments prepared by M.M. Ahmed were discussed and carefully formulated provision dealing with the collection, management of the foreign exchange current, as well as mode of dealing with foreign aid negotiations were prepared for presentation to the government said of the meeting later that evening.
On the evening of March 23, when the Awami League team returned to resume discussion on this economic provision, they learnt that Yahya had been away from Presidents House for the whole day indeed, Peerzada mentioned something about this being in the Cantonment and subsequent evidence was to show that March 23 had been the day when the 'Generals' had been meeting. Now we know for certain that it was at this time that the plan for operation Searchlight was given final approval and that two of its authors personally undertook helicopter rides on 24 March to pass the instruction to Brigade Commanders of their trust outside Dacca. The inference from these circumstances seems irresistible that the discussions which M.M. Ahmed was having with the Awami League team regarding financial and economic provisions were being prolonged by the government said merely to consume time and to provide a cover while real preparations were afoot in the Cantonment for implementation of a military solution'. By the morning of 24 March, the Awami League team had concluded discussions of this economic provision and for all questional purposes a clause-by-clause reading of the entire draft Proclamation. When the Awami League team was leaving for the evening session on March 24, Sheikh Mujib indicated that for the name of the State, we should propose 'Confederation of Pakistan'. He indicated that should explain that this was necessary to meet the sentiments of the people. The proposal in part reflected the intensity of popular sentiment for independence, here particularly as this was articulated by the young militants who were in the vanguard of the mass movement which was surging ahead.
When this proposal was put to the government said, they strongly objected arguing that this represented a fundamental change in our stand. We argued that a change in the name did not amount to a fundamental change when all the substantive provisions remained intact, so that a limited but viable federal government had been adequately provided for. Cornelius seemed to appreciate the word “Union” could be taken as a substitute for “Confederation". The Awami League then re-iterated its position, starting, however, that this point of difference related to a single word, and if the issue was not resolved, this matter could be resolved at the meeting of Sheikh Mujib and Yahya later, when the final draft was placed before them for their consideration.
The Awami League team could also sense that the situation outside was becoming very grave as the Army had moved to unload the M V Swat in Chittagong by using military force and hundreds of thousands of civilians were blocking their path in the road leading up to the Chittagong Port. Reports of military operations also came in from Rangpur. Reports were also reaching Dacca that the army was preparing to launch and onslaught. It was therefore felt that the 24th evening meeting should be a conclusive one, where the discussion should be brought to a close as there was little point in further prolonging technical discussions.
In the evening, the reading of all the clauses and the schedules of the draft was concluded. I then asked Peerzada, with a note of urgency, as to when the draft could be finalized? From the Awami League side it was proposed that I should sit with Cornelius that very night to finalize the draft, so that it could be put up before Sheikh Mujib and Yahya the next morning. Cornelius was agreeable but Peerzada held him back, saying “No, we have some discussions this evening, you may meet tomorrow morning.” When I suggested that a time may be fixed on the following day, Peerzada again intervened to say that this could be done over the telephone and that he would be contacted over the phone. Then Peerzada turned to me and said, “When do you think the Proclamation should be made?”, to which I replied that it should have been made the day before yesterday' and that the way things were going (I had in mind the situation in Chittagong and Rangpur, where the army had fired on civilians and Bengali policemen) time may be running out. It was in this context that Tajuddin said that Awami League team thought that they had exhaustively discussed everything and there was nothing more to discuss. All that remained to be done was for a draft to be put before Sheikh Mujiband Yahya for their ultimate approval. Once approved, the Proclamation could be promulgated. This statement of Tajuddin has been sought to be misconstrued to make it appear that it was Awami League that broke off the negotiations. In fact, this was far from the truth. Since exhaustive discussions had taken place, what is required was finalization of a draft to be put up before Sheikh Mujib and Yahya. I waited for a telephone call throughout the fateful 25th. This telephone call never came. Indeed, when I finally took leave of Sheikh Mujib at about 10.30 pm, on 25th March, Sheikh Mujib asked me whether I had received such a telephone call. I confirmed to him that I had not. A onslaught was launched by the army that night upon the Bangalec people, and the genocide and the bloodbath, the avoidance of which was the principal objective of holding the negotiations and seeking a negotiated political settlement, began.
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